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iii PREFACE 
The European Observatory on National Family Policies was established by the 
Commission of the European Communities to monitor changes in family forms and 
family policies (and other policies which impact on the family) in all member states 
of  the  European  Union.  Each  year  two  Reports  are  produced:  they  are 
complementary and seek to  achieve different objectives. The Synthesis Report 
analyses, on a comparative basis, the development of family policies and focuses 
on key themes and questions; emergent policy questions are identified and a 
contribution made to shaping the policy agenda. 
A companion volume serves a separate purpose and reports, descriptively and 
schematically, on trends and developments within each country. The information 
reported relates to  the period January - December 1995  and has been mostly 
obtained from experts in each member state using a pro forma questionnaire. 
Inevitably there is variation in the extent and detail of coverage. Attempting to 
describe developments which are so recent brings many challenges: the absence of 
comparable statistical data and the need for perspective on events are the two most 
obvious examples. 
It is our firm hope and expectation that taken together these volumes will make 
a helpful contribution to the analysis and development of contemporary family 
policy. They are written with a commitment to the improvement of quality of life 
for all families: we hope to have made a small contribution to making that goal a 
reality. 
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vii INTRODUCTION 
The European Observatory on National Family Policies has continued with its task 
of monitoring both trends in family formation and the policies which shape and 
impact upon families. This is the first year in which we have been able to report on 
developments across the whole of the Union, including the new members: Austria, 
Finland and Sweden.  Whereas the companion volume has concentrated on a 
country-by-country review it is the objective of this volume to identify and analyse 
specified themes. The nature of research into families, family and other relevant 
policies is  such that selection and focus are imperative if superficiality is to be 
avoided. For that reason, and following discussion within the Observatory and 
agreement with the European Commission, we concentrate on four substantive 
topics. First, and as a regular feature of these reports, we review the developing 
demographic position in Europe. We are fortunate in having among our members 
expert demographers and are privileged in the level of access we have to the 
European Union' statistical service, Eurostat: we are able to report, for the first time, 
some early results from the European Household Panel Survey. A special topic of 
particular concern for our review of  1995, and forming Chapter Two, concerns legal 
and  policy  responses  to  cohabitation.  Once  again,  detailed  information  was 
supplied for each country by Observatory members in response to a pro forma 
questionnaire prepared by the Coordination Team. There is general awareness of 
the growing attraction and significance of cohabitation but we still lack robust 
statistical information on its status, prevalence and stability. This chapter provides 
a review of the most recent data and marks the limits to current knowledge: much 
remains to be researched. 
As a second topic for 1995, we asked all Observatory members to review debates 
around social protection for families in each of the member states (Chapter Three). 
We were acutely aware that in several countries there was growing and often bitter 
controversy about the status and efficacy  of universal benefits payable to  all 
families regardless of income. The debate, we believed, was being shaped by a 
powerful mixture of expenditure constraint, inconclusive evidence on the net 
impact of social security transfers on behaviour and poverty, and a form of moral 
panic (in some countries, at least) about birth rates and lone parenthood. The 
evidence we received confirmed the importance and centrality of the debate but 
encouraged  us  to  believe  that  the  discussion  was being conducted in more 
temperate and reasoned manner than first feared: moreover, greater concern was 
being displayed about the well-being of  families and the need to insulate them from 
the worst effects of economic re-structuring than previously thought. 
Another  regular  feature  of  these  reports,  using  the  model  families  matrix 
methodology, is the discussion of the impact of tax and benefit policies on the 
living standards of families of different size, composition and income level. The 
raw data for this exercise, the very building blocks of the analysis, are supplied by 
each member of the Observatory on a national basis. Allowing for detailed but 
necessary assumptions about income and expenditure Chapter Four profiles the 
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relative value of packages of support for families and draws attention to shifts in 
policy objectives and emphasis. 
At a European level, 1995 saw a continuation of social, economic and demographic 
trends as analysed in the previous report. Against a background of demographic 
ageing and declining birth rates, there is continued commitment to the pursuit of 
equal opportunities in respect of female  labour market participation which is 
interacting with labour market re-structuring to fundamentally alter the pre-
existing balance between male and female employment. The extent to which this, in 
turn, impacts on the balance between male and female roles within the family, is at 
the heart of both policy and academic debate: the issues are analytical or political 
according  to  context.  The  paucity of high quality empirical evidence on the 
consequences of labour market restructuring for family life is remarkable given the 
importance that can  be attached to these responsibilities and relationships. Equally, 
but more tendentiously, there are those (but not within the Observatory) who seek 
to  assert  policy  initiatives  (such  as  reinforcing  'traditional'  roles  through 
manipulation  of social  and  employment protection  legislation)  as  a  way  of 
reconciling work-family relationships while, at the same time, contributing to the 
lowering of male unemployment rates. Our approach seeks to  illuminate the 
challenges which global and societal changes pose for families. We do not intend to 
be either prescriptive or moralistic: we leave that to politicians and preachers. CHAPTER ONE 
The Demographic Context of Families 
Introduction 
The relationship between demography and family policy is a reciprocal one. Like 
other policies, family policies need to take account of the demographic situation of 
a country-the size, age and structure of its population. In their turn, policies, and 
perhaps  especially  family  policies,  may have an  impact on demography by 
influencing the decisions which individuals make: about whether and when to 
marry or live with a partner, whether or when to have children and, indeed, how 
many children to have. For parents with children, policy will influence when their 
children finish education and training, when they leave the parental home, and 
when they start work. Policy can also affect whether people work, when they retire 
and  even when and  where  they  die.  Though policy  may  not be  the  main 
determinant of these events, it is certainly a contributory factor. 
Demographic factors have an obvious impact on the demand for a wide range of 
services, at all stages of the life cycle, from maternity services, child benefits and 
schools to housing, health and social services and ultimately even demand for 
burial and crematorium services. Demographic trends are also a key determinant  of 
a country's ability to pay for services, an issue which is of concern to all countries in 
the European Union in the context of changing family structures, falling birthrates, 
and ageing  populations.  An understanding of  trends in the development of 
national family policies is therefore crucially dependent upon an understanding of 
trends and developments in families themselves. This is especially true in the 
current period of rapidly changing population structures. 
Sources of comparative demographic statistics 
Sources of comparative demographic material have improved a good deal in recent 
years, although problems of comparability and gaps in information remain. Some 
of the regular reports of the OECD contain useful comparisons of population 
structures and the OECD also produces ad hoc studies from time to time with useful 
comparative population data (for example OECD, 1990; OECD, 1993; OECD, 1994). 
The Council of Europe produces an annual review which is extremely useful 
(Council of Europe, 1995). Then there are ad hoc studies undertaken by national 
statistical bureau-for example the UK Office of National Statistics in its quarterly 
publication Population Trends produces articles which sometimes draw on primary 
comparative studies (for example, Begeot, Smith and Pearce, 1993). Studies such as 
the Luxembourg Income Study generate demographic data as a by-product of the 
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analysis of comparative data sets. Finally there are other ad hoc comparative studies 
on specific topics which collect material which contributes to a comparative data 
base (for example see Bradshaw et al., 1996). At the EU level we have had to rely 
until recently on data collected on an ad hoc basis either through National Round 
Tables or more recently through national informants in the observatories and 
networks. 
Eurostat now collects, analyses and presents comparative demographic data. This 
effort was sanctioned by the Treaty of Maastricht which required the Commission 
'to draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objective of Article 1, 
including the demographic situation in the Community'. As well as the annual 
Demographic  Statistics  Eurostat  provides  the  Commission  with  the  material 
produced as The Demographic situation in the European Union  (CEC, 1996) and also 
Major Issues in European Demography (CEC, 1995). In addition, Eurostat publishes a 
variety of papers containing data on different aspects of the European demographic 
scene. In 1996, data from the first wave of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP), covering twelve of the member states of the EU, became available for 
the first time. Together these form the main source for the material in this chapter. 
Population size 
All the EU countries undertook censuses in 1990 or 1991. Table 1.1  shows that 
estimates of population size in 1995 vary from 81.5 million in Germany to only 
400,000 in Luxembourg. Since 1950 all the EU countries have experienced growth 
Table 1.1: Population size and population growth 
Country  Population (millions)  Annual % increase  Annual % increase 
1995  1950-1990  1980-1990 
Belgium  10.1  0.32  0.13 
Denmark  5.2  0.37  0.04 
Germany  81.5  0.29  0.17 
Greece  10.4  0.59  0.53 
Spain  39.2  0.66  0.29 
France  58.0  0.57  0.42 
Ireland  3.6  0.35  0.24 
Italy  57.3  0.39  0.14 
Luxembourg  0.4  0.56  0.54 
Netherlands  15.4  0.90  0.58 
Austria  8.0  0.23  0.31 
Portugal  9.9  0.31  0.03 
Finland  5.1  0.44  0.50 
Sweden  8.8  0.40  0.31 
United Kingdom  58.5  0.27  0.23 
Sources: Begeot, Smith and Pearce (1993) Table 1, Council of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) The Demographic Context of  Families  3 
in their populations ranging from an average of 0.27 per cent per year in the UK to 
0.90 per cent in the Netherlands. There was a slowing in the annual average rate of 
growth in all countries in the 1980s and in Denmark and Portugal there was hardly 
any growth at all. 
Population growth rates are a function of fertility, migration and mortality, and the 
relative contribution of each of these factors varies both from country to country 
and over time. Various estimates have been made of the likely future size of the 
populations of EU  countries.  The higher of these  estimates envisage average 
growth of 0.57 per cent per year between 1993  and 2020.  The lower estimates 
envisage a decline of 2.6 per cent in the overall population between 1993 and 2020 
and reductions in the population in every country except France, The Netherlands 
and Portugal during that period. 
The population of Europe is a declining proportion of the world population as well 
as a declining proportion of the population of the industrialised world. Variations 
in growth rates within the EU inevitably alter the relative proportions of the overall 
EU population contributed by the different member states. Between 1980 and 2020 
the percentage of the population which is French, Dutch, Portuguese, Greek and 
Spanish is expected to grow while the proportion which is Italian, German and 
British is expected to decline. However, the relative stability of the EU population 
means that the age structure is more important than the size of the population. The 
primary determinant of the age structure is past and present fertility rates. 
Fertility 
In order for the population to reproduce itself each woman needs to have 2.1 
children. The measure of the number of children each woman will have during her 
life is the Total Period Fertility Rate. Table 1.2 shows that every country in the EU 
now has a fertility rate below replacement level. Ireland's fertility rate had for some 
time been an outlier in this respect but  as a result of an extraordinarily rapid decline 
in fertility, Ireland reached sub-replacement fertility in 1993. In the southern EU 
countries fertility levels began to fall about a decade after the northern countries, in 
the 1970s, but the decrease in fertility has now overtaken the northern countries, 
and has still not stabilised. Spain and Italy now have the lowest fertility rates in the 
industrialised world. A seeming uniformity in fertility rates masks considerable 
variations in how they are achieved-thus in Denmark, the UK and France there are 
high levels of births outside marriage. In Germany there are high proportions of 
childless women, whereas in France there are fewer childless women but more one 
child families (Eurostat, 1992b). 
Despite a considerable literature on the subject, no entirely satisfactory (or rather 
simple) explanation has been produced for fluctuations in fertility. A two volume 
five  country Eurostat study concluded 'that there is no identifiable stable link 
between labour force  participation and fertility outcomes. However there is a 
process of joint determination, affected by macroeconomic situations and the 
cultural and social fabric' (Eurostat 1991, volume 1, para 16). There is no doubt that 
birth control technology and abortion have enabled the separation of  sexual activity 
and childbirth, enabling marriage and child bearing to be delayed. This in turn has 
been associated with an increased participation of women in paid employment. 
This is likely to lead to further delay in giving birth because, in addition to the not 4  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 1.2: Total period fertility rates 
Country  1970 
Belgium  2.38 
Denmark  1.95 
Germany  2.03 
Greece  2.39 
Spain  2.90 
France  2.47 
Ireland  3.93 
Italy  2.42 
Luxembourg  1.98 
Netherlands  2.57 
Austria  2.29 
Portugal  2.83 
Finland  1.83 
Sweden  1.92 
UK  2.43 
Source: Demographic Statistics 1996, Eurostat 
*Estimated or provisional data 
1980 
1.68 
1.55 
1.56 
2.21 
2.20 
1.95 
3.25 
1.64 
1.49 
1.60 
1.62 
2.18 
1.63 
1.68 
1.90 
1990  1994 
1.62  1.55* 
1.67  1.80 
1.45  1.26 
1.39  1.35 
1.34  1.22* 
1.78  1.65* 
2.12  1.86 
1.34  1.22* 
1.61  1.72 
1.62  1.57 
1.45  1.44 
1.57  1.44 
1.78  1.85 
2.13  1.88 
1.83  1.74 
inconsiderable direct costs of having a child, indirect or opportunity costs (lost 
earnings, foregone  promotion prospects, lost pension rights and so on) create 
disincentives. Increased opportunities for women in the expanding service sector, 
rising levels of earnings (both absolute and relative to men's) in most EU countries 
further  exacerbate  these  costs.  Increased  relationship  breakdown,  which  is 
associated with economic independence, not only interrupts child bearing, but 
creates a climate in which it is more risky. It becomes even more important for a 
woman to remain in the labour market, given the high risks of poverty for lone 
parents.  The  economic  recession  of  the  early  1990s  may have  also  made  a 
contribution to fertility decisions as it undoubtedly did in the 1930s. 
There are some demographers (for example Brass, 1989)  who believe that this 
decline in fertility is merely delay- a generation of women have chosen to have 
their babies in their thirties rather than their twenties. It  is argued that fertility will 
catch up as they have their babies later. It  is true that the decline in fertility in some 
northern EU countries ceased during the 1980s and there is some evidence of a 
recovery of fertility  in some (Scandinavian) countries in recent years.  This  is 
because the age specific fertility rates in those countries has been increasing for the 
over 30s.  But there is no EU country whose fertility  rate has yet recovered to 
replacement level and in the US and the Nordic countries where fertility began to 
recover earliest it has stuck at sub-replacement level and indeed begun to fall again. 
Many of the countries that began the fertility decline have now experienced nearly 
a child bearing generation at sub-replacement level - it is too late to catch up. The Demographic Context of Families  5 
Meanwhile the labour supply of married women continues to increase as does 
marital disruption. Family planning technology is likely to become more efficient 
with the male contraceptive pill and the abortion pill. There is little or no evidence 
that men are adapting their behaviour to make it easier for women to be mothers 
and workers. All this suggests that fertility is likely to remain at low levels or 
continue to decline. 
One  obvious  question  is  whether  it  matters  that  fertility  continues  at  sub-
replacement level? Given the lack of concern in most EU countries, the answer 
is clearly thatit does not. Indeed in the short term reductions in fertility, particularly 
if  the rate then remains stable, may have beneficial social, economic and ecological 
consequences. There can be savings in public expenditure on child related services 
and benefits or indeed improvements in them (for example one consequence of the 
decline in births in Ireland has been the decision to make substantial increases in 
child benefits). Also unemployment can be solved demographically, pressure on 
housing reduced and so on. The anxieties arising from sub-replacement fertility are 
two-fold; first, what would be the consequences for the economy and social fabric 
of European countries if  labour supply does not keep pace with labour demand; 
second, what are the economic costs and social and economic consequences of an 
ageing population. While ageing is certainly on the agenda of EU countries, given 
the parlous state of labour demand and new threats to European competitiveness 
from the newly industrialised Asian economies, possible future labour shortages 
are not a concern. 
Historical evidence suggests that social and fiscal policies may not be very efficient 
in engineering changes in fertility behaviour.  Attempts to employ incentives in 
many of the former Eastern bloc countries had little success. The evidence from 
France,  which  has  pursued  pro-natalist  policies  for  over  80  years,  is  not 
encouraging. France has a slightly lower fertility rate than the UK which has never 
espoused pro-natalist policies. All the evidence suggests pro-natalist policies may 
encourage mothers to have babies earlier: they may increase fertility by  0.1 or 0.2 but 
beyond that they have had little impact. It  is conceivable that more concerted, more 
generous pro-natalist policies might have more impact, but they would require 
considerable transfers of  resources in favour of women and families of  child bearing 
age, at the expense of childless and elderly people, and they would still have to 
compete with the attractions of labour market. 
Changing family form 
While there is evidence that in respect of fertility the EU countries have become 
more alike, when we turn to trends in the structure of families there appears still to 
be a good deal more variation. Nevertheless family form is changing throughout 
Europe and although the changes have been much greater in some countries than 
in others they appear to be common throughout the EU. In general the forms of 
families that have dominated European populations since about the first world war 
have become much more diverse, complex and volatile and these changes present 
social policy with new challenges. The variations within Europe can be depicted as 
a north/  south divide - northern countries starting out on the trends earlier than 
southern countries and southern countries beginning later but catching up rapidly, 
albeit from a lower base. Although there is some truth in this hypothesis, as we shall 
see there is still considerable variation for some indicators within the south and 6  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
northern  blocs (as well as confusion about how to classify countries such as Ireland). 
There is also considerable variation between regions within some countries. 
We have already seen in relation to fertility that women are having fewer babies and 
that this is partly a function of delayed marriage. Table 1.3 compares the mean age 
of mothers at the first birth. Since 1970 this has increased by about three years in 
most countries. The mean age of women at child bearing was very similar in the EU 
countries in 1994, varying from 30.3 years in Ireland to 27.5 years in Austria. There 
is also a smaller difference than in the past between the mean age at first birth and 
mean age at childbirth overall, as women are completing their families within a 
shorter period. 
Table 1.3: Age of mothers at first birth (1994) 
Country  Mean age at first birth 
Belgium  -
Denmark  27.2 (1993) 
Germany  27.5 (1993) 
Greece  26.1 
Spain  27.2 (1992) 
France  27.4 (1992) 
Ireland  26.6 (1993) 
Italy  27.4 (1993) 
Luxembourg  -
Netherlands  28.3 (1993) 
Austria  25.9 
Portugal  25.4 
Finland  27.4 
Sweden  27.0 (1993) 
UK  26.2 (1993) 
Source: Eurostat, 1996, Council of Europe, 1995 
*Estimated or provisional 
Mean age at childbearing 
28.2* 
29.1 
28.2 
28.0 
29.5* 
28.8* 
30.3 
29.6* 
28.8 
29.9 
27.5 
27.9 
29.1 
29.2 
28.1 
Table 1.4 gives the crude marriage rate for EU countries in 1994. Since 1970 this has 
declined in every country in the EU. Marriage is also occurring later-at least three 
years later since 1970 in most northern EU countries.  Marriages where one of the 
partners has already  been married have  been a growing proportion of all marriages, 
and this applied to more than a quarter of all women marrying in Denmark and the 
UK in 1994, although over 90 per cent of marriages were first marriages in Ireland 
and the southern EU countries.  Remarriage is  also  in decline,  however, and 
cohabitation following  marriage breakdown, as well as before  marriage, has 
become common. In most countries there is evidence that marriage is not just  being 
delayed but that fewer people are marrying overall. The Demographic Context of  Families  7 
Table 1.4: Marriage rate, age at first marriage and proportion of marriages which 
are first marriages 
Crude marriage rate  Age at first marriage  First marriages as % 
Country  (1994)  <females, 1994)  total marriages 
<female, 1994) 
Belgium  5.1  25.2  80.2 
Denmark  6.8  28.9  73.4 
Germany  5.4  26.3  76.6 
Greece  5.4  25.6  91.9 
Spain  5.0*  26.2 (1993)  95.6 (1993) 
France  4.4  26.7  83.5 
Ireland  4.6*  27.0 (1992)  99.2 (1992) 
Italy  5.0*  26.1 (1993)  96.3 (1993) 
Luxembourg  5.8  26.3  81.0 
Netherlands  5.4  27.0  82.5 
Austria  5.4  25.8  80.2 
Portugal  6.7  24.6  94.2 
Finland  4.9  26.7  81.6 
Sweden  3.9  28.5  79.6 
UK  5.9 (1993)  25.8 (1993)  72.6 (1993) 
Source: Eurostat 
*Estimated or provisional data 
The decline in marriage and the increased age at which marriage begins has been 
associated  with  an  increase  in  births  outside  marriage,  and  an  increasing 
proportion within cohabitation. Table 1.5  shows that the proportion of births 
outside marriage was over a third in the UK, France and Finland and accounted for 
around half of births in Denmark and Sweden by 1994. Although there is still 
considerable variation in the proportion of births outside marriage in the EU and 
very different rates of increase, all countries have experienced at least a doubling 
in births outside marriage since 1970. An increasing proportion of births outside 
marriage are to couples who are cohabiting. 
Cohabitation, which is becoming increasingly widespread and significant as a 
living arrangement, is extremely difficult to compare across countries because 
of the difficulty of establishing the nature of living together relationships. Data 
from the ECHP providing the most recent and comparable estimates of prevalence 
are included in Chapter Two. As with other data on cohabitation, they should be 
regarded with some caution as, partly because of its commonly sequential nature 
and also because it is not well accepted in some countries, there is likely to be 
a degree of under-reporting. In addition, the distinction between whether someone 
is  living  as  a  lone parent or a  cohabiting partner is  not always consistently 
drawn. 8  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 1.5: Births outside marriage 1994 
Country  Births outside marriage as % of  all live births 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
Source: Eurostat (1996) 
Table 1.6: Divorces 
Country  Total divorce rate 
(1993) 
Belgium  0.33 
Denmark  0.42 
Germany  0.28 
Greece  0.12 
Spain  -
France  -
Ireland  not applicable 
Italy  0.07 
Luxembourg  0.35 
Netherlands  0.30 
Austria  0.34 
Portugal  -
Finland  0.43 
Sweden  0.46 
UK  0.44 
Source: Eurostat (1996), Council of Europe (1995). 
-missing data 
12.6 (1991) 
46.9 
15.4 
2.9 
10.8 (1993) 
34.9 (1993) 
19.7 
7.4 (1993) 
12.7 
14.3 
26.8 
17.8 
31.3 
51.6 
32.0 
Crude divorce rate (1994) 
(per 1000 population) 
2.2 
2.6 
2.0 
0.7 
0.7 (1993) 
1.9 (1993) 
not applicable 
0.5 
1.7 
2.4 
2.1 
1.4 
2.7 
2.5 
3.1 (1993) The Demographic Context of  Families  9 
Marriage (and possibly also cohabitation) has become more unstable than in the 
past, leading to increases in relationship breakdown and divorce. The divorce rate 
is influenced by difficulties of access and it can be seen in Table 1.6 that it varies 
considerably between countries, with the UK and Denmark having the highest 
rates and Ireland, Italy and Greece the lowest; in most countries it has more than 
doubled since 1970, although from rather different bases. Since the mid 1980s the 
divorce rate has begun to level off in some countries. It is not clear whether this 
reflects a  genuine increase in the stability of marriage or whether it is simply 
because of the increase in cohabitation, which means that relationship breakdowns 
are not officially recorded. 
Changing family forms have contributed to the increase in the proportion of 
families headed by a  lone parent, an increase which has been associated with 
concern about a range of issues, including the poverty of lone parent families and 
the impact on children of family breakdown. The definition of a lone parent family 
varies considerably between countries due to differences in the age at which 
children are defined as dependent, and in the treatment of cohabiting couples and 
also because in some countries there are problems in identifying lone parents in 
multi unit households (Roll,  1992,  Bradshaw et  al,  1996).  The latest Eurostat 
estimates are given in Table 1.7a and they show that the proportion of families with 
Table 1.7a: Lone parent families 
%Lone  % Lone parent  % Lone parent families 
Country  parent  families with  with at least one child 
families  children under 6  under 15 
1990/91  1990/91  1990/91 
Belgium  14.1  14.9  14.6 
Denmark  8.5  13.5  20.4 
Germany  11.5  14.3  15.4 
Greece  7.6  3.2  5.7 
Spain  10.0  - 6.0 
France  10.4  8.3  10.8 
Ireland  15.0  8.8  10.7 
Italy  11.8  - -
Luxembourg  12.7  10.5  12.3 
Netherlands  10.1  11.2  12.2 
Portugal  9.2  6.1  9.0 
United Kingdom  13.5  19.2  19.0 
Austria  13.0  13.4  -
Finland  12.4  10.3  -
Sweden  8.5  14.1  -
Sources: Eurostat (1995), EC (1995) 10  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
a child under 15 who were headed by a lone parent varied from 20.4 per cent in 
Denmark to 5.7 per cent in Greece. 
Bradshaw  et al (1996) have produced independent  and more recent estimates as part 
of a special study for the Observatory on the labour supply of lone parents. Their 
estimates are summarised in Table 1.7b and in addition the final column of the table 
also shows estimates derived from the European Household Panel Survey. All 
these estimates are different and there is clearly a need for Eurostat to produce new 
and more consistent estimates if this increasingly prevalent family form is to be 
monitored. 
The vast majority of lone parent families are headed by a woman - 83.3 per cent 
in the EU in 1990/91 (Eurostat, 1995) but there is considerable variation in the 
marital composition of the lone parent population. Ireland has a particularly high 
proportion who are widows/widowers (61 per cent) and the UK has the highest 
proportion who are single never married (38 per cent) (Bradshaw et al, 1996). 
Table 1.7b: Lone mother and lone father families as percentage of all families 
with children: most recent data 
Lone mothers  Lone fathers  Lone  Lone parents 
(%of  all  (%of  all  fathers as  with children 
Country  families  families  %of/one  as a% 
with children)  with children)  parents  of  households 
with children* 
Belgium (1992)  9.7  1.2  12  13.2 
Denmark (1990)  16.2  2.4  13  17.7 
Germany (1992)  16.0  3.0  16  6.2 
Greece (1990/91)  8.7  2.2  25  5.6 
Spain (198P)  4.8  0.7  13  5.8 
France (1990)  11.4  1.8  14  12.5 
Ireland (19932)  9.5  1.1  10  12.3 
Italy (1991)  5.3  11.0  17  7.5 
Luxembourg (1992)  6.0  1.2  17  7.8 
Netherlands  13.5  2.4  15  10.7 
Austria (1993)  13.4  1.9  12  -
Portugal (1991)  11.3  1.8  14  7.0 
Finland (1993)  13.9  1.9  13  -
Sweden (1990)  15.3  2.7  15  -
UK ( 1991)  19.1  1.8  9  18.7 
Source: Bradshaw eta/ (1996) and* Eurostat, initial results from ECHP 
1  Madrid area only 
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Families and households 
In respect of family form, there is still evidence of considerable diversity within 
the EU. Thus for example the prevalence of large households varies considerably, 
with 26.7 per cent of households in Ireland (in 1990/91) containing five or more 
persons compared with only 4.8 per cent in Denmark. Table 1.8 shows the break-
down of population by household type for the countries covered by the ECHP. 
Table 1.8: Household composition (% of all households) 
Lone  Married  Cohabiting  Single  Married  Cohabiting  Other  All 
Country  parent  couple  couple  person  couple  couple 
and  and  and  no  no 
children  children  children  children  children 
Belgium  4.1  24.4  2.4  16.1  10.7  2.8  39.6  100 
Denmark  4.3  15.2  4.8  27.7  11.1  6.8  30.2  100 
Germany  1.5  21.8  1.0  20.8  10.5  1.9  42.6  100 
Greece  1.8  30.3  0.2  10.0  9.6  0.4  47.7  100 
Spain  2.2  35.0  1.0  5.3  7.3  0.7  48.6  100 
France  4.0  24.2  3.9  16.7  11.0  3.9  36.4  100 
Ireland  5.3  36.7  1.0  11.0  6.5  0.6  39.3  100 
Italy  2.4  29.5  0.1  10.1  9.5  0.0  48.3  100 
Luxembourg  2.2  24.5  1.6  16.8  12.0  4.1  38.9  100 
Netherlands  3.0  24.1  1.0  21.1  13.5  6.4  31.0  100 
Austria  - - - - - - - 100 
Portugal  2.9  34.5  1.0  5.1  7.5  0.0  49.3  100 
Finland  - - - - - - - 100 
Sweden  - - - - - - - 100 
UK  5.6  22.2  2.1  13.3  12.7  3.6  40.4  100 
Source: Eurostat, initial results from ECHP1 
Note: The 'Other' category includes all those not covered by the household types specified including 
households with children over the age of 18 years. 
Across the EU, over 55 per cent of people live in households consisting of a couple 
with children, but there are considerable variations between countries, with a range 
from 20 per cent in Denmark to almost double this proportion in Ireland. Single 
person households are increasing across the European Union, and ten per cent of 
the population now lives  alone.  Along with ageing and changing patterns of 
household formation, marriage breakdown has contributed to the increase in single 
person households and probably an associated increase in isolation and loneliness 
(Kaufmann, 1993). By 1990/91, 26.7 per cent of EU householqs were single person 
households and the proportion ranged from 34.4 per cent in Denmark to 13.4 per 
cent in Spain (see Table 1.9). 
1 Space does not permit a discussion of the methodology employed in this survey. Interested readers are 
referred  to  European Community Household Panel - Survey Methodology and Implementation 
(September 1996) which is available on request from Eurostat. 12  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 1.9: One person households 
Country  One person households as 
% of  all households 1990/91 
Belgium  28.4 
Denmark  34.4 
Germany  33.6 
Greece  16.2 
Spain  13.4 
France  27.1 
Ireland  20.2 
Italy  20.6 
Luxembourg  25.5 
Netherlands  30.0 
Portugal  13.8 
United Kingdom  26.7 
Austria  29.7 
Finland  31.7 
Sweden  39.6 
Source: Eurostat (1995)1 
Data  from  the  ECHP  would  suggest  that  the  proportion  of  single  person 
households is much lower, ranging from around five per  cent in Spain and Portugal 
to around 28 per cent in Denmark, but the rank order remains similar. Recent work 
by Wall (1996), comparing household patterns in Italy, Spain and Great Britain, 
demonstrates not only differences between countries in the proportion living alone 
but also in living arrangements by gender. 
Table 1.10: Co-residence patterns of people aged 75 and over in three countries (%) 
Men  Women 
Country 
Great Britain  Italy  Spain  Great Britain  Italy  Spain 
Partner no children  59  60  54  22  18  19 
Partner and children  4  12  13  1  2  4 
With relatives  5  7  18  9  19  37 
Alone  28  17  10  60  51  29 
Source: Wall, 1996 
1 This table is based on census data which tends to overstate numbers of single person households in 
some countries. See Hantrais and Letablier (1996), for a discussion of the methodological issues. The Demographic Context of  Families  13 
Sixty per cent of elderly women live alone in Great Britain, compared to only half 
this number in Spain (See Table 1.10). Elderly women are more likely to be living 
alone than elderly men in all three countries. Men are around three times more 
likely to be living with a partner, mainly because women tend to outlive men. Men 
in Italy and Spain are much more likely to be living with a partner and children, 
both because adult children remain in the parental home for longer and possibly 
because of larger age gaps between partners. Elderly people in Spain are much 
more likely to be living with relatives than those in Italy and Great Britain; and 
women are around twice as likely to as men. Under ten per cent of women in Great 
Britain live with relatives, compared to four times this number in Spain. 
Table 1.11 shows the residence patterns of people aged 15-29. Young men are more 
likely to be living with both parents in Italy and Great Britain, whereas young 
women are likely to be living with a partner; around 20 per cent live with a partner 
and have children. Age differences between partners may again be relevant here. 
Young people in Spain and Italy are more likely to remain in the parental home until 
marriage, whereas in Britain, as in the other northern European countries, a pattern 
of living with unmarried partners or unrelated adults normally precedes family 
formation. 
Table 1.11: Co-residence patterns of people aged 15 - 29 in three countries (%) 
Men  Women 
Country 
Great Britain  Italy  Spain  Great Britain  Italy  Spain 
With both parents  46  70  73  35  56  73 
Partner no children  14  6  5  18  10  7 
Partner and children  13  9  9  20  22  17 
Non relatives only  7  0  0  6  0  1 
Source: Wall (1996). 
Amongst households with children, the number of children per family varies not 
only from country to country but also with household type. Tables 1.12, 1.13, and 
1.14  show  the  number  of children  in  all  households  with  children,  couple 
households and lone parent households. In most countries, one and two-child 
families are most common, although three-child families form more than ten per 
cent of all households with children in eight countries. Ireland is markedly different 
from the other countries in that over a quarter of households with children have 
three children, and nine per cent have four, at least twice the proportion of any 
other country. Portugal has the highest number of one-child families; these form 
half of all households with children. 
Compared with couples, lone parents are much more likely to have only one child; 
in six countries almost two-thirds of lone parents have only one child, compared 
with 40  to 45  per cent of couples with children. In Portugal, there is very little 
difference, because of the high rate of one-child families overall. Lone parents in 
Ireland, although they are much more likely than couples to have only one child, 
still have much larger families than lone parents in other countries. 14  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 1.12: All households with children: Numbers of children under 18 
Country  %with 1  %with 2  %with 3  % with4 
Belgium  46.6  36.5  12.8  3.0 
Denmark  47.4  40.1  8.9  2.1 
Germany  43.1  41.7  11.6  2.3 
Greece  40.0  48.1  9.4  1.6 
Spain  45.1  43.3  9.4  0.7 
France  43.8  38.3  13.1  3.8 
Ireland  26.9  33.4  24.3  9.3 
Italy  46.6  38.6  11.5  2.6 
Luxembourg  44.8  36.9  15.9  2.0 
Netherlands  31.8  48.1  16.1  3.1 
Austria  - - - -
Portugal  50.0  36.5  10.1  2.1 
Finland  - - - -
Sweden  - - - -
UK  39.7  41.6  13.7  3.4 
Source: Eurostat-Initial results from European Community Household Panel 
-missing data 
Table 1.13: Couple households: Numbers of children under 18 
Country  %with 1  %with 2  %with 3  %with 4 
Belgium  44.9  37.4  13.2  3.4 
Denmark  43.7  43.56  9.8  2.3 
Germany  41.9  42.5  12.0  2.3 
Greece  38.7  49.4  10.0  1.7 
Spain  44.5  43.6  9.7  1.8 
France  41.1  40.2  13.7  4.0 
Ireland  25.0  33.6  25.2  9.8 
Italy  45.0  39.9  11.9  2.6 
Luxembourg  42.9  37.5  17.0  2.3 
Netherlands  29.4  49.1  17.2  3.3 
Austria  - - - -
Portugal  50.3  36.4  10.2  2.2 
Finland  - - - -
Sweden  - - - -
UK  37.3  43.2  14.4  3.3 
Source: Eurostat-Initial results from European Community Household Panel 
-missing data 
%with 5/5+ 
1.1 
0.6 
1.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0.9 
6.2 
0.7 
0.3 
1.0 
-
0.9 
-
-
1.6 
%with 5/5+ 
1.2 
0.7 
1.4 
0.3 
0.4 
1.0 
6.5 
0.6 
0.3 
1.1 
-
0.9 
-
-
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Table 1.14: Lone parent households: Numbers of children under 18 
Country  %with 1  %with 2  %with 3  %with 4 
Belgium  57.9  30.6  10.4  0.6 
Denmark  64.8  29.4  4.9  0.9 
Germany  62.1  30.3  5.1  1.3 
Greece  62.7  36.4  - -
Spain  55.7  37.6  4.6  1.0 
France  63.2  25.1  8.7  2.8 
Ireland  40.7  32.0  17.8  5.2 
Italy  65.6  22.9  6.5  2.7 
Luxembourg  68.2  28.6  3.2  -
Netherlands  52.4  40.1  6.2  1.3 
Austria  - - - -
Portugal  52.1  37.9  8.7  1.0 
Finland  - - - -
Sweden  - - - -
UK  50.2  34.5  10.7  3.8 
Source: Eurostat-Initial results from European Community Household Panel 
-missing data 
Ageing populations 
%with 5/5+ 
0.5 
-
1.5 
0.9 
1.2 
0.3 
4.4 
2.3 
-
-
-
0.4 
-
-
0.7 
As in all industrialised countries, the populations of the EU countries are all ageing. 
This is affected by earlier trends in fertility and migration and is also influenced by 
continuing increases in life expectancy. In 1994 life expectancy at birth for men 
ranged from 71.6 years in Portugal to 76.1 in Sweden. Life expectancy for women is 
invariably higher than for  men, with some interesting differences  in the gap 
between men and women-the smallest gap being in Denmark (5.2 years) and the 
largest in France (7.2)  years. There are also quite large differences in the rate at 
which the expectation of life has increased between countries. Thus for example in 
Denmark the expectation of  life for women  has increased by  around four years since 
1961/62 whereas in Portugal it has increased at three times this rate over the same 
period (Table 1.15). 
It is notable that the poorer countries in the EU are not necessarily the ones with 
shorter life expectancies, although infant mortality rates in Greece and Portugal are 
the highest in the EU, at 7.9 and 8.1 respectively, compared with 4.4 in Sweden, and 
around six per thousand for the EU as a whole. Belgium also has a rate of 7.6, 
suggesting that differences are not necessarily a function of economic factors alone. 
In their 1994 report on the demographic situation the European Commission (1995) 
identified four groups of member states in relation to ageing: Germany, Belgium 
and  Italy  are  member  states  where  the  older  age  groups  eclipse  the  new 
generations; Denmark, Luxembourg, the UK and Greece where this tendency is not 16  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 1.15: Life expectancy at birth 
Country  Life expectancy at birth 
(male, 1994) 
Belgium  73.4 
Denmark  72.7 
Germany  73.1 
Greece  75.2 
Spain  73.8 (1993) 
France  73.8* 
Ireland  73.2 
Italy  74.7* 
Luxembourg  73.2 
Netherlands  74.6 
Austria  73.4 
Portugal  71.6 
Finland  72.8 
Sweden  76.1 
UK  74.2 
Source: Eurostat (1996) 
*Estimated or provisional data 
Life expectancy at birth 
(female, 1994) 
80.1 
78.1 
79.6 
80.2 
81.1 (1993) 
81.9 
78.7 
81.2* 
79.7 
80.3 
79.7 
78.6 
80.1 
81.4 
79.4 
Infant mortality rate, 
1994 
(per 1000 live births) 
7.6 
5.6 
5.6 
7.9 
6.0* 
5.8* 
5.9 
6.6* 
5.3 
5.6 
6.3 
8.1 
4.7 
4.4 
6.2 
so pronounced but is becoming pronounced given their fertility trends; Spain, 
Portugal, France and The Netherlands have balanced numbers of the oldest people; 
and finally Ireland where the population is still predominately young. 
The conventional way to represent ageing is in terms of dependency ratios, though 
there are a number of variations in the ways these are defined in the comparative 
literature.  In Table  1.16  the  first  column is  one way of  representing the child 
dependency ratio. The second column represents the pensioners, dependency ratios 
and the third column is  the overall dependency ratio.  The point of these three 
comparisons is  to show that countries vary in their relative level of dependency 
depending on which ratio is used. Thus the child dependency ratio shows that 
Ireland has by far the highest level of dependency. The pensioners dependency ration 
has Sweden and then the UK with the highest dependency levels. The combined 
dependency  ratio  has  Ireland,  Portugal  and  Spain  with the  highest  levels  of 
dependency. The final column presents combined dependency ratios for 1995. This 
shows thatfor most countries the overall dependency ratio fell between 1990/91 and 
1995. This is probably due to a decline in the number of children in those countries. 
These are still rather crude comparisons of real differences in dependency between 
countries. A valid comparison would need to take account of the age at which The Demographic Context of  Families  17 
Table 1.16:  Dependency ratios 
0-19  60+  0-19+60+  0-19+60+ 
Country  20-59  20-59  20-59  20-59 
1990/91  1990/91  1990/91  (1995) 
%  %  %  % 
Belgium  45  38  83  83 
Denmark  43  37  80  77 
Germany  37  35  73  73 
Greece  - - - 85 
Spain  53  36  90  84 
France  49  37  87  86 
Ireland  74  31  106  97 
Italy  - - - 78 
Luxembourg  40  33  72  75 
Netherlands  44  30  74  73 
Austria  43  36  78  76 
Portugal  58  36  91  85 
Finland  45  33  79  80 
Sweden  43  43  89  88 
UK  48  39  87  85 
Sources: Eurostat (1996) and Begeot, Smith and Pearce (1993). 
education and training ceases, unemployment rates, the labour force participation 
rates of men and women of working age, and particularly the age at which people 
commonly retire (see CEC, 1995). An assessment of the 'burden' of ageing would 
then require consideration of variations in the consumption of resources (cash 
benefits and services) by the elderly population. As far as services are concerned, 
there is a good deal of evidence that  while there are more people living to older ages, 
older people are becoming fitter and less dependent than previous generations and, 
as most health resources are used in the final year of life, ageing does not necessarily 
imply a greatly increased burden in terms of health expenditure. Against this 
argument there is the fact that in many countries the fastest growth in numbers of 
elderly people is amongst those aged over eighty, who are more likely to require 
personal care services than younger groups. 
The crucial issue is whether the quality of life of those additional years will be 
improved. Much attention has been focused on health and the consumption of 
health services and so-called 'disability free life expectation'. However, health is 
only one aspect of quality of life. Also of concern is whether the living standards of 
elderly people will enable them to participate in society and whether there is the 
capacity in (changing) families and other social relationships to sustain the quality 
of existing systems of obligation and exchange. 18  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Conclusion 
Many of these demographic changes are occurring so rapidly that we are still in 
the process of developing tools to describe and understand them. Traditional 
demographic statistics on births in and out of wedlock, marriage, remarriage and 
divorce, do not fully capture all the emerging changes in family form. Comparative 
data sources are improving, but there is still a great need for more comparable data 
on families and households in the European Union. It  is also clear that analysis of 
regional trends is going to become ever more important as spatial dualities, such as 
uneven concentrations of elderly people in certain areas, increase. 
Family forms have become much more complex with an increase in the proportion 
of step and other relationships, which may have important consequences for the 
patterns of mutual obligation and support which sustain families. We have seen 
that young people typically spend longer in the parental home in the southern 
countries; longer periods of education and training and increased unemployment 
amongst  young  people  are  extending  this  pattern  to  other  countries,  with 
consequences likely to include further delays in family formation. 
Any crisis is also an opportunity; thus anxieties about the demographic situation 
are leading to a new concern with the operation of labour markets and an increased 
recognition of the need for investment in human capital, economic investment to 
create jobs and social investment to encourage occupational activity. At the same 
time the inadequacies of the existing social model, based on patterns of work and 
family life which no longer apply to the majority, create a need for new forms of 
social protection at different stages of the life cycle. The policies required will in turn 
generate  a  continuing  demand  for  more  rigorous  and  scientific  analysis  of 
demographic trends and their consequences. CHAPTER TWO 
Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation 
Increasing numbers of women and men are choosing to live together without 
marrying in all the European Union countries. There is little consensus on the 
meaning of this phenomenon, with some commentators arguing that there are few 
differences between (heterosexual) cohabiting relationships and legal marriages, 
whereas others view them as a source of instability and lack of permanence in 
family  relationships.  In  dealing with cohabitation,  governments face  difficult 
issues. It  is possible to ignore the childless cohabiting couple, but once children are 
born decisions about legal status can no longer be avoided. This highlights a 
number of questions which are at the heart of family policy: What is a 'real' family? 
What status attaches to the unmarried father? Should rights of custody and access 
be conceptualised as rights of  parents or rights of children? Should legal and policy 
decisions treat women as economic equals or compensate for their lack of equality 
in practice? Can the competing demands of property law and family  law be 
reconciled?  National  governments  will  inevitably  decide  these  questions  in 
different ways, for reasons relating to legal tradition as well as demographic, social 
and economic factors.  There are important variations both in the incidence of 
cohabitation and in attitudes towards it, not only between but also within Member 
States. In Greece, for instance, cohabitation is a matter which is of no great concern 
to either public opinion or legal bodies, mainly because there are few instances 
where children are involved. As a result cohabitation is largely unregulated and 
regarded as a private matter between the individuals concerned.  In Germany, the 
protection of the family enshrined in the constitution applies only to marriage and 
not to 'marriage-like partnerships'. This implies a principled commitment not to 
accord equal status to married and cohabiting relationships, although in practice 
cohabiting relationships are increasingly acknowledged. In Denmark and Sweden, 
at the opposite end of the spectrum, cohabitation has achieved the status of an 
accepted social institution (Trost, 1988). 
This chapter seeks to analyse the extent to which law and policy in the Member 
States have taken account of cohabitation. It is based on responses to a standard 
questionnaire completed by the national informant for each Member State, together 
with an analysis of the tax and benefit treatment of cohabitation using the methods 
described in Chapter Four. Although it is clear that issues relating to homosexual 
cohabitation are the subject of lively debate in some countries (see, for instance 
chapters on Finland, Spain and the Netherlands in Ditch et al, 1997, forthcoming) it 
was not possible to include them in this study, which is concerned only with 
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heterosexual couples  sharing residential  accommodation.  The  chapter cannot 
purport to provide a comprehensive analysis of how policies affect cohabiting 
couples in practice, but rather uses the legal and policy framework to analyse 
national differences in responding to this phenomenon. 
Demographic Trends 
The prevalence of cohabitation, and specifically, as we have noted, the birth of 
children  within cohabiting  relationships,  is  likely  to  be an important  factor 
influencing policy responses. Reliable statistical data on the extent of cohabitation 
is, however, notoriously difficult to obtain. Defining cohabitation is problematic; 
marriage and divorce are  definite  events  marking the beginning and end of 
particular legal relationships, whereas by contrast cohabitation is usually a private 
event, unmarked by any form of official registration. However, it is increasingly 
recognised that divorce is a poor indicator of living arrangements, since the parties 
have usually lived apart for some time by this stage. Marital status has also lost 
much of its explanatory power; it is no longer a primary indicator of fertility 
behaviour, health and other factors with which it had previously been associated. 
Living arrangements are now more significant, although marital status remains 
an important secondary variable (Trost,  1988).  This in turn creates a need for 
accurate information on the extent of cohabitation, and the different types of 
cohabiting relationships which exist. This appears at present to be collected most 
systematically in Sweden, as part of regular household survey. Official registration 
of cohabitation, which is  possible in some countries, also represents a possible 
source of data. 
In comparing the prevalence of cohabitation in European countries, Kiernan and 
Estaugh (1993) distinguish three groupings; countries where cohabitation is well 
established such as  Sweden, Denmark and Iceland,  those  (including Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK)  where it is emerging 
primarily as  a  transitional  phase preceding  marriage,  and  those  where it is 
comparatively rare  (Ireland and the  countries of Southern Europe).  Regional 
differences in the prevalence of cohabitation are also important (see, for instance, 
Prioux's (1995) analysis of trends in France). 
Table 2.1 Women cohabiting as% of all women in unions (marriage/cohabita-
tion) by age- selected countries 
Country  16-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-37  40+ 
Denmark (1985)  88  75  41  20  10  7 
France (1986)  - 36 {21-24)  14  10  6  5 
N'lands (1986)  59  37  16  7  4  3 
Austria {1989)  45  21  8  4  3  2 
Finland (1985)  75  50  25  12  7  7 
Sweden (1985)  93  78  48  28  17  12 
UK (1986)  42  24  10  7  4  4 
Source: Kiernan (1993) Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation  21-
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Figure 2.1
More recent and systematic data on the extent of cohabitation  has recently become
available from thgfirst wave of the European Community  Household Panel (1993 /
41), covering twelve of the European  Union countries.  Figure 2.1 shows the large
variation in the numbers of childless cohabiting  couples,  from around 45 per cent of
all couple households in Denmark to under one Per cent in Italy and Portugal.
Figure 2.2 shows cohabiting couples with children  as a proportion of all couples
with children. This proportion is lowest in Greece and ltaly, and highest in
Denmark and France. Although around 50 per cent of children are born to
cohabiting  parents in Denmark,  cohabiting  couples with children represent only 25
per cent of all households with children. As well as the number of children born to
each family, both subsequent marriage  and relationship breakdown will affect this
proportion, serving as a reminder that, like lone parenthood,  cohabitation  is
frequently a temporary and unstable status.
Prinz (1995) identifies four distinct (and, he argues, irreversible) stages in the
development of cohabitation; in the first, cohabitation is a deviant phenomenon,
occurring in small numbers  across the age range. Later, cohabitation  becomes both
more widespread and acceptable, but primarily  as a prelude to marriage, and thus
such unions are mainly found among the young and childless. A third stage
wihresses  rises in the number of children born within cohabiting relationships,  but
there are still important distinctions  between marriage and cohabitation which
mean that they function as alternative living arrangements. A fourth stage,
described as 'a type of marciage' is reached when the distinctions  between marriage
I Marriage and cohabitation cannot be distinguished in ECHP data for The Netherlands.22 Europmn  Obseraatory  on National Family Policies
and cohabitation become meaningless,  not so much because cohabitation  has
become more like marriage but because marriage more closely resembles
cohabitation,  with increasing individuation, independence, and negotiated,  rather
than implicit, duties and responsibilities. Prinz argues  that all can exist in parallel;
this is crucially  dependent on the legislative framework adopted, since a model
which sought to impose the rights and obligations  of marriage on cohabiteeswould
preclude  the possibility  of cohabitation continuing  to function as an alternative to
marriage. Moreover, the typology presented by Prnz appears to conflate
demographic change and policy response, whereas there is every likelihood that
countries will adopt different  policies in the face of similar demographic trends,
given the existence of differing legal, religious, economic and cultural factors
(Rubellin-Devechi,  1 996).
Figure 2.2
Legal and policy responses to cohabitation
In response to increasing  levels of cohabitation, there are a number of fields in
which intervention  may be deemed necessary  or desirable.  Haskey and Kieman
(1989) identify four key areas of interest for fhe policy maker: legil implications
concerningthe  rights and responsibilities  of cohabitees and their childrery financial
implications including  decisions  relating to the payment  of social security benefits,
the impactof national social policies on families and households, and demographic
implications.
The issue of whether family policies should attempt to influence behaviour  by
providing incentives to certain forms of family life is a vexed one. Whilst
cohabitation  was widespread  in the past, and is increasing considerably  at present,
marriage,  and its attendant rights in respect of property and children,  has been
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dominant across Europe for at least a century.  The precise legal relationships 
created  by  marriage,  and  the  implications  which  these  have  for  parental 
responsibility and the allocation of property, vary considerably between countries, 
but are formally codified and widely understood in each country. Cohabitees, by 
contrast, do not generally have recourse to an established body of legislation, and 
are frequently not aware of their exact legal situation.  Prinz (1995) has identified 
nine possible models of legal regulation of cohabitation, ranging from total non-
intervention to a functional model which offers the option of different levels of legal 
obligation between the parties; his study of ten European countries concludes that 
most have adopted a piecemeal approach. He argues that, far from undermining 
marriage, legal reform is essential if marriage is to be seen as a viable option for 
contemporary couples: 
For  an  increasing  number  of  people  duties  and  responsibilities 
associated with marriage are no longer compatible with their needs. It 
is incorrect to conclude that no demand for legislation exists for this 
group of the population. More options are needed than ever before to 
meet the many requirements of today's partnerships.  (p.178) 
This does not, of course, imply that the rights of married and cohabiting couples 
need be identical. There are opposing arguments against the removal of legal 
distinctions between cohabitation and marriage; that to do so would undermine the 
status of legal marriage, or that, conversely, it would interfere with the rights of 
cohabiting couples by creating a legal relationship which was neither sought nor 
desired. Kingdom (1996) and Deech (1980) have argued that one solution to these 
dilemmas would be to create a legal framework for the recognition of cohabitation 
contracts,  thereby  allowing  the  parties  to  the  relationship  to  decide  on  an 
appropriate level of obligation for themselves. As we shall see, there is evidence of 
some movement in this direction in certain countries. Without wider legal reform, 
however, private contractual arrangements are not binding on public authorities 
and thus do nothing to address inequalities in such areas as inheritance taxes or 
social security provision. Moreover, whilst contract law is based on the formal 
equality of the parties, in reality women may find themselves disadvantaged by a 
relative  lack  of  economic  power,  especially  when  they  have  children.  The 
protection of both current and future living standards may require statutory 
intervention. There are also certain areas where the state is unlikely to allow people 
to divest themselves of responsibility, as in the provision of continuing financial 
support for  children. The birth of children appears to be a  decisive factor  in 
triggering legal obligations between cohabitees in most countries, and the rationale 
for many policy interventions is founded in the concept of 'the best interest of the 
child'. McRae (1993), writing about the UK, argues that this tends to subvert the 
intentions of the individuals concerned: 
..... some part of the growth  in modern-day cohabitation arises from the 
attempt made by men and women to find ways of living that make 
sense to them, individually  ...... .lnsofar as such men and women have 
children, the imposition by the state of equal rights and obligations 
obviates  this  attempt,  arguably  with  considerable  justification. 
Cohabiting couples who wish to avoid rights and obligations may be 
advised also to avoid having children.  (p.107) 24  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
This  raises  the question of whether there are significant differences between 
marriage and cohabitation as relationships, posed neatly by Prinz (1995): 
Cohabitation has many of the characteristics  of marriage:  shared 
dwelling,  economic union, sexual intimacy,  and not infrequently 
children. Is there any real difference between the two?  (p.79) 
For individuals, the choice to cohabit rather than marry is likely to be based on a 
number of  personal and practical considerations. Ressler and Waters (1995) offer an 
economic explanation for increasing rates of cohabitation, arguing that as women 
and men become more equal in economic terms, there is less to gain from marriage, 
particularly for women, and present some evidence in support of this theory in the 
form of a demonstrated relationship between levels of cohabitation and levels of 
female labour force participation in the different states of the USA. Prinz (1995) also 
cites increasing gender equality as the primary factor. The cohabiting relationship 
may  be  thought  to  offer  benefits  in  terms  of  independence,  flexibility, 
impermanence, and equality (McRae, 1993; Kingdom, 1996; Prinz, 1995; Kiernan 
and Estaugh, 1993). Alabart et al  (1988)  find evidence that these aspects may be 
particularly important for women where role expectations within marriage are 
inflexible. Not all of those in cohabiting relationships will have made a conscious 
choice of this type of living arrangement as an alternative to marriage, however, 
and many will later marry. McRae (1993), in her study of cohabiting mothers in the 
UK, found that roughly half were opposed to the idea of marrying, either because 
they saw marriage as offering no advantages or because they actively objected to 
marriage on ideological grounds. The remaining half intended to marry at some 
stage in the future but had not done so for  a variety of reasons. Of formerly 
cohabiting mothers who had subsequently married, the majority cited the security 
of their children as a primary motive. 
Tax and benefit treatment of cohabitation 
The treatment of cohabiting couples in the tax and benefits system is a subject which 
occasionally excites controversy because of  supposed disincentives to marry  which, 
it  is  argued,  act  to  undermine the traditional family.  There  is  evidence that 
governments are increasingly tending to equalise the treatment of married and 
cohabiting couples in this area, although this is at least as likely to be motivated by 
pragmatic  financial  concerns  as  by  a  political  commitment  to  supporting  a 
particular model of family life. In times of public expenditure cutbacks, cohabiting 
couples represent a 'soft target' where savings can be made without creating a 
public outcry; thus increases in the amount of tax paid by cohabiting couples 
(effective from January 1996) were a feature of the recent Juppe reforms in France. 
Table 2.2 provides a schematic overview of the treatment of cohabitation in tax and 
benefit legislation. The over-riding impression is that many states appear to want to 
'have their cake and eat it'. On the one hand, all member states, with the exception 
of Greece, tend to treat cohabiting couples as one household for the purposes of 
determining eligibility to means-tested benefits. In Portugal the cohabitee is only 
treated as part of the benefit household after two years of co-residence.  Other 
countries,  including  Sweden,  Italy,  Ireland  and  the  UK,  in practice  operate 
discretionary rules of thumb regarding the definition of a cohabiting relationship 
for these purposes. Whilst the de facto  financial interdependence of cohabiting Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation  25 
couples is recognised for social assistance purposes, it is a different matter where 
entitlement to derived rights is concerned. No member states provide pensions and 
only a small minority survivor's  benefits, based on the contributions of a cohabiting 
partner. In Denmark and Sweden, as there is universal entitlement to a retirement 
pension this issue does not arise. In Ireland, it is possible to obtain an increase in 
retirement pension in respect of a cohabiting partner who has no entitlement in 
their own right. Spain and Austria provide health cover in respect of economically 
dependent cohabitees. France is unique in extending rights to allowances for a 
dependant partner to lesbian and gay couples, as well as heterosexual cohabitees, 
although these are limited to sickness and maternity insurance. 
In  Sweden,  survivor's  benefits  are  available  where  the  surviving partner  is 
responsible for dependent children under the age of 12 who live in the same 
household or where the parties have cohabited for five years or more. In Denmark 
a cohabiting partner is entitled to compensatory payments made where a person's 
death is the result of an industrial accident or the actions of a third party. In France, 
Table 2.2: Tax and benefit treatment of childless cohabitees 
Treated as unit  Entitled to  Tax paid  Derived 
Country  for social  survivors'  compared to  rights to 
assistance  benefits  married couples  benefits 
Belgium  yes  no  more if  one earner,  no 
less if two 
Denmark  usually  some  more if  one earner  no 
Germany  usually  no  more  no 
Greece  no  no  less if  two earners  no 
Spain  yes  no  more  heath care 
France  yes  no, some  same  some, 
exceptions  includes 
same-sex 
couples 
Ireland  yes  no  more if  one earner  some 
Italy  varies  no  more if  one earner  no 
Luxembourg  yes  no  more  no 
Netherlands  yes  yes-from  same  no-some 
July 1996  exceptions 
Austria  yes  no  more if one earner  only health 
insurance 
Portugal  yes  yes-from  more if one earner  no 
(after 2 years)  1994 
Finland  yes  no  more if  one earner  no 
Sweden  yes  some  same  no 
UK  yes  no  more  no 26  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
there is entitlement to a one-off payment in respect of the person's death. In the 
Netherlands, cohabitees will become entitled to survivor's benefits in July 1996. 
Portugal already pays survivor's benefits where cohabitees have lived as partners 
for two years, although establishing this fact is not always straightforward and has 
given rise to a number of  court  cases. In Spain, the treatment of  surviving cohabitees 
has been tested in the courts several times in recent years; although the decision not 
to pay benefits has been upheld, the principle that such payments may be justified 
appears to have gained a degree of acceptance, and it is anticipated that there will 
be legislative changes granting such provision in the near future. A draft law was 
introduced during 1995 but the anticipated costs are impeding its progress onto the 
statute book. 
1400  - ~1200 
.......  c 
~  1000  - 0>  800  c 
;;:: 
Q)  600  ....... 
(/) 
U-1  400 
(/) 
a..  a..  200 
a.. 
0 
Married/cohabiting couples 0.5 ave 
Net disposable income, bhc, 1 earner 
+--+--~~--~--r--r--r--+.~1+-~~~--r-~--+-~ 
~4-~~--+-~-+~r-~1H.  --+-~-+--r-+•~ 
- -
-
8  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  L  NL  A  P  SF  S  UK 
•  cp+1(7)  0  ch+ 1(7) 
Figure 2.3 
There are least differences in income tax liability between married and cohabiting 
couples with children. Figure 2.3 shows the projected outcome for a model family 
consisting of a couple with one seven-year-old child with a single earner on  average 
earnings (before housing costs), using the method described in Chapter Four. At 
this level of earnings married couples are better off than cohabiting couples in nine 
of  the fifteen countries of  the European  Union, but  these differences are small except 
in the case of Belgium, Germany and Denmark. 
Figure 2.4 shows the net disposable income (before housing) for a couple with one 
child with two earners; the man on average male earnings and the women receiving 
0.66 average female earnings. Only at this income level do some fiscal advantages Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation  27 
of cohabitation become apparent: in Portugal, Italy, France and Belgium these 
couples have slightly higher levels of  income, whereas married couples continue to 
have  higher  incomes  in  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece  and  the  UK.  Childless 
cohabiting couples who are both working, however, pay more tax than married 
couples in Spain, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and the UK, and several countries 
have tax regimes which favour childless married couples where there is a single 
earner - the traditional 'breadwinner' model - these include Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Portugal and Finland. 
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Figure 2.4 
Private arrangements, in the form of life insurances and private pensions are an 
increasingly  important  area  of  financial  provision  in  many  countries,  and 
information on the extent to which cohabitation is recognised by such schemes was 
sought as part of this study. At present no member state has initiated statutory 
provisions in respect of  cohabitation, and the evidence is that the rights of bereaved 
and separated former cohabitees are highly dependent on the rules of individual 
pension and insurance schemes. 
Rights and responsibilities of cohabiting parents 
Married couples jointly enjoy both parental rights and responsibilities in all of the 
Member States. Cohabiting couples, and particularly cohabiting fathers, have a less 
clear-cut legal relationship with their children. A summary of these rights and 
responsibilities can be found in Table 2.3.  All member states impose a duty of 
financial maintenance on the unmarried father whose paternity is established, 28  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
although in Germany, the amount of maintenance expected (and paid in practice) 
is less than for married fathers, possibly in recognition of their lack of legal status; 
any involvement with the child  is  currently possible only with the mother's 
permission. This link between financial and other aspects of parental responsibility 
is more implicit in other countries, but there are obvious tensions between the 
benefits to both parent and child of a recognised legal relationship, and the possible 
disincentives  created  by  the  financial  consequences  of  establishing  such  a 
relationship. This dilemma is  addressed most directly in France and Belgium, 
where rights of access are available to non-custodial fathers regardless of whether 
the  parents  are  married  and  of  whether  the  father  has established  parental 
responsibility. 
Unmarried fathers must typically make a formal declaration recognising the child 
in order to establish parental responsibility, as in Finland, France, Italy, and Greece. 
In Belgium it is necessary for the father to obtain the permission of the mother (or of 
the child, where he or she is over 15 years of age) before such a declaration can be 
made. The unmarried father may experience particular problems where the mother 
refuses to confirm paternity. This is most likely to arise when cohabitees separate 
without  having  formally  established  parental  rights.  Fathers  who  have  not 
established a legal relationship with the child have no rights of access in Spain, 
Finland, Sweden and Germany.  Unmarried fathers in Greece have no automatic 
rights of access to their children in case of separation, and there is no case law on 
how such issues should be resolved. Custody  may, however, be exercised where the 
mother is unable or unwilling to do so, or by the decision of the courts. In Ireland, 
parents who have not been granted guardianship of their children may apply for 
custody or access to the child, and this will be granted by the courts if it is deemed 
to be in the best interests of the child. 
In Italy  there  is  a  current debate about the need for  legal  regulation of the 
breakdown of cohabiting relationships, in order to create more legal safeguards in 
respect of children. In Denmark, where legislation has improved the rights of the 
unmarried father since 1995, there was some discussion of the introduction of 
compulsory joint custody, on the grounds that a child has the right to have two 
parents. This was, however, rejected because it was felt that compulsion would 
inevitably have detrimental effects on relationships. 
Another aspect of a cohabiting partner's parental responsibilities is the right to 
adopt their partner's child from a previous relationship. This is possible in Belgium, 
Spain, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Austria. It is only in Spain that the 
couple are permitted to adopt jointly; in the other cases, the cohabiting partner is 
treated as a single person adopting a child. Legislative changes which will allow 
adoption by cohabiting couples are anticipated in The Netherlands. In Denmark it 
is possible for a cohabitee to adopt their deceased partner's child where the child 
has been brought up by them both in the same home. In Sweden, cohabiting couples 
are not allowed to adopt children, and the consent of biological parents must be 
obtained in all cases of adoption. 
Rights of inheritance 
One function of marriage is the protection of property rights. Thus in the past it has 
been common to differentiate between children born within and outside marriage. Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation  29 
Table 2.3:  Parental rights and obligations of unmarried couples 
Obligation to  Parental  Joint custody  Comments 
Country  maintain  responsibility  possible on 
child  for fathers?  breakdown? 
Belgium  yes  father must apply- yes if  parentage  Can apply for 
subject to consent  established  access even 
of mother I child  where parentage 
not established 
Denmark  yes  yes  yes (1995) 
Germany  yes (less  no legal authority  joint custody  access only with 
than if  possible  mother's 
married)  from 1997  permission 
Greece  yes  father must  no automatic  Law unclear and 
legally recognise  rights court  no case law on 
child  decision  custody and 
access 
Spain  yes  yes if  recognised  court decision- no legislation 
mothers usually  no access rights 
get custody  if  no paternity 
France  yes  yes if  recognised  yes - and equal  child can be 
and parents live  rights to access  recognised after 
together  even where child  breakdown of 
not recognised  relationship 
Ireland  yes  agreement/  court decision  welfare of child 
court order  paramount 
Italy  yes  yes if  recognised  agreement/  current debate on 
court decision  need to extend 
regulation 
Luxembourg  yes  parents make  yes 
declaration 
Netherlands  yes  yes if  recognised  yes, subject to  generally same as 
mother's consent  for married couples 
Austria  yes  only mother has  sole custody- shared parental 
parental  usually  rights not 
responsibility  mother  possible for 
unless court decides  divorced couples 
Portugal  yes  agreement  per parental  access by court 
responsibility  decision if  no 
sole or joint  parental 
(1995)  responsibility 
Finland  yes  father must apply  per parental  no access rights 
responsibility  if  paternity not 
(1984)  established 
Sweden  yes  father must apply,  subject to  access by court 
mother must  mother's  decision 
consent  consent 
UK  yes  agreement/ court  mother, unless  no rights to 
decision  father estab- access I court 
lishes (1989)  decision 30  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Although inheritance rights
1 are now the same for children born  within and outside 
marriage in all fifteen countries
2
, this is a development which has only taken place 
over the last thirty years, and in the case of Belgium and Ireland, in the last ten3• 
Several studies (for instance, Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993; Prioux, 1995) have noted 
a tendency for cohabiting couples to be in lower occupational and income groups 
than their married counterparts, suggesting that those with assets to protect are 
likely to desire the formal protections offered by legal marriage. It is also possible 
that legislation and attitudes towards inheritance rights will vary considerably 
between countries which are predominantly urban and those where agriculture 
and land ownership are an important aspect of life. O'Neill (1987) in a study of rural 
villages  in  Portugal,  found  evidence  that  agricultural  landholding  patterns 
continued to exert a powerful influence on the prevalence of cohabitation and 
timing of marriage. 
Cohabitees, in contrast to married partners, have no automatic rights of  inheritance 
in any country (although in Portugal a cohabitee without means of subsistence is 
entitled to make a claim for maintenance against the estate of a deceased partner). 
Therefore they can be provided for only by means of a will. This in itself will have 
a greater or lesser impact depending on national legal traditions; Rubellin-Devechi 
(1996)  cites widely varying national differences in intestacy rates. A cohabitee's 
share of the estate is subject to the primary claims of other heirs, such as a spouse or 
children, in Ireland, Luxembourg, France, the UK, Austria, Italy and Belgium. It is 
possible for a cohabitee to inherit on roughly equal terms with a married partner in 
Sweden and The Netherlands, although proof of five years cohabitation is required 
in the latter case.  In Spain and Portugal the amount of the possible inheritance is 
limited to a third. Cohabiting partners also have to pay more in inheritance tax than 
married couples  in all  countries except Denmark, Sweden, The  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Ireland. In Germany, these taxes can be as high as 62 per 
cent, and in Belgium they amount to 80 per cent on bequests in excess of 6,000,000 
BEF. 
Housing rights and the allocation of property on relationship breakdown 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5  provide summary information on the housing and property 
rights of married and cohabiting couples when a relationship ends. This policy area 
is complicated by the fact that the aims and outcomes of housing law, family law, 
property law and matrimonial law are not necessarily identical. 
In most countries there are no automatic rights for either party to remain in rented 
housing when childless couples separate, whether they are married or cohabiting. 
In Belgium and Denmark, the matter is decided by the general legislation relating 
to contracts and in Spain some rights are provided by housing law. Consideration 
of the best interests of the child means that custodial parents are more likely to 
remain in rented accommodation, except in France, Greece and Portugal, where the 
presence  of children  implies  no  additional  rights.  In  Austria,  Belgium  and 
Germany, there are guaranteed rights to remain which apply to married parents, 
but not their cohabiting counterparts. 
1  Nationality rights may be affected in some member states if the child's mother is a non-national. 
2 In  Germany, children born  outside marriage currently inherit under different procedures, although the 
financial outcome is intended to be the same. 
3  For comparison, Norway abolished this distinction in 1916. Legal and Policy Responses to Cohabitation  31 
Table 2.4: Treatment of rented accommodation on relationship breakdown 
Country  Married,  Cohabiting,  Married,  Cohabiting, 
no children  no children  children  children 
Belgium  No automatic  Contract/  Automatically  Decided by 
rights  common law  custodial  interests of 
parent  child 
Denmark  'Neediest'  Contract  Usually to  Court decision 
partner gets  (person named  custodial  if  no agreement 
accommodation  on lease)  parent 
Germany  Can remain  As married  Can remain  As married 
Greece  No rights  No rights  No rights  No rights 
Spain  Can be  By agreement,  Almost always  As no children 
transferred  some rights  to custodial 
as part of  under housing  parent 
divorce  law, also at 
landlord's 
discretion 
France  Can be  Can be  As no children  As no children 
transferred  transferred if 
cohabiting 1  yr+ 
Ireland  No automatic  No automatic  Usually custodial  Landlord's 
rights  rights  parent  discretion 
Italy  No automatic  No automatic  Usually custodial  Interests of child 
rights  rights  parent 
Luxembourg  No rights  No rights  Interests of child  Interests of child 
Netherlands  No automatic  No automatic  Interests of child  Interests of child 
rights  rights 
Austria  Court decision  No automatic  Landlord must  Landlord's 
on divorce  rights  accept custodial  discretion 
parent if court 
decides 
Portugal  No automatic  No automatic  Transfer possible  No rights 
rights  rights 
Finland  No automatic  No automatic  No automatic  No automatic 
rights  rights  rights  rights 
Sweden  'Neediest'  As for married  Usually custodial  Usually custodial 
partner gets  parent  parent 
accommodation 
UK  No automatic  No automatic  Usually custodial  Interests of child 
rights  rights  parent 32  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 2.5: Treatment of owner-occupied housing on relationship breakdown 
Country  Proceeds of sale  Right to remain 
Belgium  Married- statutory unless contract made  Married partner must give consent for 
Cohabiting-common law unless contract  sale of property-cohabitee can seek to 
remain where in best interests of child 
Denmark  Married-statutory (equal shares)  Married must purchase partner's share, 
Cohabiting - general property law  no rights for cohabitees 
Germany  Married-family law  Not possible for cohabitees, even 
Cohabiting-only exceptionally  where children involved 
Greece  Married- split between partners  No automatic rights 
Cohabiting- as married, if common 
property acquired during cohabitation 
Spain  Married-statutory arrangements  Custodial parent usually remains in 
Cohabiting- case law (varies)  property on divorce 
France  Married-family law  No automatic rights 
Cohabiting- agreement/ common law 
Ireland  Married- split between partners  No automatic rights 
Cohabiting-agreement 
Italy  Married-split equally  Custodial parent usually remains in 
Cohabiting-agreement/ common law  property on divorce. Cohabitee can 
apply to juvenile court if  children 
Luxembourg  Married - marriage settlement  Interests of child - married and 
Cohabiting - no set rules  cohabiting couples 
Netherlands  Married-statutory unless specific contract  Custodial parent on divorce, but must 
Cohabiting-individual unless specific  pay rent to ex-spouse, no rights for 
contract  cohabitees 
Austria  Married - established legal arrangements  To custodial parents on divorce, no 
Cohabiting- on basis of legal ownership  rights for cohabitees 
Portugal  Married - on basis of legal ownership  Custodial parent on divorce, but must 
Cohabiting-on basis of legal ownership  pay rent to ex-spouse, no rights for 
cohabitees 
Finland  Married - equal, with some exceptions  May go to custodial parent on divorce, 
Cohabiting - no set rules  no rights for cohabitees 
Sweden  Married- split between partners  Tends to go to custodial parent, 
Cohabiting - as married  whether married or cohabiting 
UK  Married-split according to range  Custodial parent on divorce, cohabitee 
of factors  with children can apply in child's 
Cohabiting-agreement/ trust law  interests 
Married couples without children generally enjoy greater rights than childless 
cohabitees in respect of owner-occupied homes. Married couples are usually dealt 
with according to a body of matrimonial law, whereas cohabiting couples are 
subject to general civil law. Countries vary in their approach to the division of 
property.  Portugal  is  unusual  in  allocating  the  proceeds  of owner-occupied 
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cohabitation. In Belgium and The Netherlands couples are able to choose whether 
to regulate the division of  property  by  contract or opt for it to be allocated according 
to matrimonial or common law. In Finland the situation is similar: proceeds from 
the matrimonial home are normally divided equally on divorce, unless there was a 
prior contract between the partners, or there are other significant circumstances, for 
instance if the marriage had lasted only for a very short period. 
Custodial parents are usually given priority in deciding who is to remain in the 
matrimonial home when married couples divorce. These rights of occupation are 
typically limited  to  a  period when the children are in full-time  education or 
economically dependent. In The Netherlands and in Portugal the custodial parent 
must pay rent to their former spouse in respect of their occupation of the home, and 
in Denmark, such occupation is possible only if the custodial parent has sufficient 
means to purchase the other partner's share of the house, which is not common. 
Although some assistance with costs may be available from public funds, this is 
strictly a transitional measure, and must be repaid. In Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the UK and The Netherlands, there are some legal possibilities for a cohabitee to 
apply for occupation of the home where this is judged to be in the best interests of 
any children involved. In France, the cohabitee has no right to remain in a property 
owned by their former partner on the breakdown of  a relationship, regardless of the 
presence of children. In Finland there is no special legislation creating rights to 
remain in either a rented or owner-occupied house on the breakdown of either a 
married or cohabiting relationship, although on divorce, courts sometimes allow 
one partner to remain in the matrimonial home, especially where there are children 
involved. In  Spain there have been a number of important court cases relating to the 
property and maintenance rights of formerly cohabiting couples, but there is not a 
dear legal position. Two recent decisions took entirely contradictory positions: one 
granted rights to a former cohabitee, whereas the other explicitly rejected the notion 
that cohabitation could be regarded as equivalent or similar to marriage. In practice 
decisions tend to be heavily influenced by evidence regarding the individual living 
arrangements  of the  couple,  whether  money was shared,  the  length  of the 
relationship and the inferences as to their intentions which can be deduced from 
previous actions (Cantero, 1995). 
Remedies in respect of domestic violence 
Table 2.6  compares the rights of married and cohabiting women experiencing 
domestic violence. For married couples, domestic violence constitutes grounds for 
divorce (and may be important in determining the level of maintenance, as in 
Austria).  Apart from  this  obvious difference, cohabiting and married women 
generally benefit from the same remedies in respect of domestic violence, although 
the substance of those rights varies considerably from one country to another. 
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. In Finland, cohabitees do not 
benefit from the rights available to married people to exclude the partner from the 
home in the case of domestic violence. In Ireland rights to a barring order are only 
available to people who have cohabited for at least six months (whereas they apply 
immediately to married couples) and they are not available at all where the violent 
partner is the sole or main owner of the family home. In Austria it is only possible 
for  a  cohabitee to obtain an exclusion order if she jointly owns or rents the 
accommodation. In France it is  also more difficult for  a  cohabiting victim of 
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the home. In the UK, the legal remedies available to a cohabiting victim of domestic 
violence cannot be used to exclude the violent partner permanently from the home, 
so that they are temporary remedies only whereas a married women can obtain a 
permanent order, and also has recourse to a wider range of legislative powers. 
Table 2.6: Remedies in respect of domestic violence-comparison of married and 
cohabiting couples 
Country  Responses to Domestic Violence 
Belgium  Same remedies-different procedures 
Denmark  Same remedies available to married and cohabiting 
Germany  Cohabitees are protected against rape, otherwise fewer rights 
Greece  Same remedies available 
Spain  Same remedies available 
France  Same rights under penal code but cohabitees who are not tenants/ 
owner-occupiers have problems obtaining exclusion orders 
Ireland  Married partners can use remedies immediately on marriage; 
cohabitees have a time condition and cannot obtain barring order if 
other partner sole/main owner of property 
Italy  Same remedies available 
Luxembourg  Same remedies available 
Netherlands  Same remedies available 
Austria  Married partner can obtain exclusion order, cohabitee cannot, if 
partner sole owner I tenant of property 
Portugal  Neither married nor cohabiting partners have any remedies available 
Finland  Married partner can obtain exclusion order, cohabitee cannot 
Sweden  Same remedies available 
UK  Married partner can obtain permanent exclusion order - more 
limited (temporary) measures available to cohabitee 
Countries vary with respect to whether violence against a cohabiting partner is 
regarded as 'family violence'. Defining assaults as 'family violence' may imply that 
it is a private matter in which the authorities should not intervene, or conversely, 
that it is a more serious offence because of the breach of trust which accompanied 
the assault. For instance in Italy, violence against a member of the family attracts 
stronger penalties in law, and cohabiting partners are included within the concept 
of family for these purposes. In Austria, by contrast, violence within a cohabiting 
relationship is regarded in the same light as any other violent assault, and there is 
no provision for a  violent partner to be excluded from the home, as exists for 
married couples. In The Netherlands, domestic violence is also not treated as a 
specific offence, but as 'ordinary' violence; injunctions and exclusion orders are 
available but tend to be used in severe cases only. In Denmark and Sweden, 
defining domestic violence as 'public' violence means that it must be investigated 
and prosecuted in the same way as any other type of violence. Where rape within 
marriage is not recognised as a crime, as in Germany, cohabiting women  have more 
legal redress than wives against this particular offence. In Portugal, neither married 
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In all of the member states, services for victims of domestic violence are available to 
all women irrespective of marital status. The availability of such services, however, 
varies considerably. In Portugal there are no refuges, although several are due to 
open in the near future. In Greece, they are concentrated in the Athens area. In other 
countries, such as Denmark and the UK, although there are a large number of 
refuges, receiving public and private funding, they are not always sufficient to meet 
demand. 
Policy responses to cohabitation-convergence or divergence? 
None of the member states appears to have adopted an overarching strategy in 
dealing with cohabitation; couples may  have the same rights as married couples for 
tax purposes, but quite different housing rights. Giving married and cohabiting 
couples equal rights may also imply making marriage more like cohabitation (as in 
the contractual allocation of owner-occupied property) or making cohabitation 
more like marriage (as in the extension of survivor's benefits to cohabitees). 
Overall, the greatest areas of convergence are to be noted in tax and benefit policy, 
and in the extension of parental responsibility. In both of these areas, there is 
evidence of a movement away from the couple as the focus of policy intervention, 
in favour of an emphasis on the parenting role. The same tendency is noted by 
Millar and Warman (1996) in their study of family obligations. At the same time, 
considerable differences remain; compare for instance the parental rights of an 
unmarried father in Germany and France. 
There is least convergence in dealing with the allocation of property, whether on 
death or relationship breakdown. Inheritance rules operate to the considerable 
disadvantage of cohabitees in nearly all member states, although the precise rules 
differ from country to country. In dealing with domestic violence, a reluctance to 
interfere with property rights in the interests of unmarried women can be noted in 
a number of countries. Similarly, the property rights of childless married women 
are greater than those of cohabitees with children in countries such as Germany and 
Austria, suggesting a continuing emphasis on couple, as opposed to parent, status. 
For men, relationship breakdown is likely to result in problems in maintaining a 
relationship with their children, whereas for  women, economic hardship is  a 
common outcome. These tendencies, which affect married couples, are exacerbated 
for cohabiting couples who do not have equal rights. An unmarried father who has 
not established paternity before relationship breakdown may have no legal rights 
to see his child. A woman caring for young children may face hardship if  she has no 
rights to remain in the family home when a relationship ends. Policies which are 
based on a presumption of equality between the partners and an expectation of 
equal  rather  than  complementary  roles  (dual  earning  couples  with  equal 
responsibility for  domestic  tasks and the upbringing of children)  are not yet 
matched by the reality of daily life in any member state, so that in choosing the 
freedoms  offered  by cohabitation,  couples  continue  to  forfeit  a  considerable 
measure of security. CHAPTER THREE 
Developments in Social Protection 
Introduction 
All Member States of the European Union provide social protection for  their 
citizens. It is the scope and form of support which distinguishes one State's system 
from another. Countries have based their social protection system on insurance 
principles to varying degrees and so benefits received are related to the payment of 
contributions, but not to the value of contributions. In addition, a basic level of 
social assistance is guaranteed to all families in need irrespective of whether they 
pay contributions or not. In countries where entitlement to the amount of basic 
social  assistance  is  not  uniform,  gaps  are  filled  by  discretionary  and  non-
standardised benefits in cash or kind administered at local level. 
Social protection provides for old-age pensions, health care, sickness and invalidity 
benefit, unemployment compensation, spending on public employment services, 
family allowances, maternity benefits and housing benefits, and in doing so has a 
major impact on employment, productivity and competitiveness. Between 1980 
and 1993 average expenditure on social protection in the EU went up from 24 per 
cent to 29 per cent of total GDP1 (Social  Protection  in  Europe  1995 p. 62), but the 
pattern of spending on the different functions of social protection varies across the 
Union. Spending on Family Allowances, for example, varies from 3.1 per cent of 
social protection expenditure in Italy to 10.8 per cent in Luxembourg (ibid p. 67, 
Table 3).  The cash transfer package to families is broadly defined as all social 
security benefits, universal and means-tested, available for families with children; 
fiscal arrangements; compensation through employer and employee contributions 
to insurance funds; and arrangements that mitigate the impact of housing, health 
care, schooling and pre-school child care. The degree to which countries have 
implemented the full package of cash transfers to families with children varies 
considerably between one country and another. 
General expenditure restraints 
All  countries  in  the  European  Union  would  prefer  to  have  high  levels  of 
employment, high levels of social protection and, at the same time, sustainable 
economic growth. The slowing of economic growth in the early nineties, ensuing 
1 This is not expenditure in absolute terms but in relation to national productivity. There are many 
reasons why social expenditure increases: increase in the size of the dependent population, growth in the 
cost of providing services, costs associated with better quality services and expansion in quantity of 
services. 
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high unemployment rates, and the belated effort by some EU States to develop a 
coherent welfare structure have placed high demands on social expenditure in a 
climate of general economic restraint. Levels of public and social expenditure in 
1990 were higher than at any other time since 1945. However the growth in social 
expenditure resulted from increasing demand rather than improvements in quality 
of service. One way governments could freely fund improvements or expansion in 
services was through the national debt. Consequently the size of the national debt 
as a percentage of GOP rose on average during this period. The steady growth in 
eight of the EU States, for example, was between nine and nineteen percentage 
points 1990 to 1993 (George and Taylor-Gooby, 1996, p.18, Table 1.10). There have 
been a variety of responses to the common problem of how to match financial 
resources and demand for social welfare. There are those designed to raise revenue; 
those intended to reduce demand; and those that cut  back on expenditure increases. 
The capacity of either higher taxation or the benefits of social change to reduce 
social expenditure is limited. In many countries, therefore, the containment of 
expenditure increases is the preferred approach. 
Specific expenditure restraints imposed by meeting the entry criteria for the 
EMU 
A specific aim in reducing social protection expenditure for some countries is to 
enable them to achieve the necessary degree of convergence to facilitate transition 
to the EMU.  The criteria for entry are that each country should achieve price 
stability with no inflation above 1.5  per cent of the average of the three best 
performing States; their government deficit should not exceed 50 per cent of GOP. 
Stability is  measured by exchange  rates and currency staying within normal 
fluctuation margins for two years and interest rate increases of no more than two 
per cent above the three best performing states over the previous twelve months. 
Forecasts for 1996 indicate that the Stage II criteria will be met by Denmark, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK. In contrast, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Sweden, Austria and the southern States of the EU require further progress. In 
Greece, Italy and Sweden the risk of undermining price and exchange-rate stability 
and high interest rates is inhibiting progress. Spain, Portugal, Austria and France 
will require greater commitment and more ambitious targets in the field of fiscal 
consolidation if targets are to be met. Finland has not prepared a convergence 
programme timetable and it is suggested that their fiscal efforts may well be too 
ambitious. The forecast for full entry in 1999 is that all Member States with the 
exception of Greece and Italy are likely to have met their arrangements for entry; it 
must be noted however, that Finland, Sweden, Portugal and Spain are classed as 
'prospects dubious'. 
The extent to which governments in different countries protect cash transfers to 
families against the background of growing pressure to reduce budget deficits, will 
depend to some degree on the character of the welfare regime that has evolved in 
the country as well as the interplay between the prevailing political and economic 
factors. This chapter first considers the extent of recent changes in cash transfers for 
families during 1995 in the context of the political, institutional and public debate of 
the day. While in some countries cash transfers to families have not escaped the 
general spirit of  entrenchment, others have maintained current levels, or continued 
to follow programmes of improvement. The latter part of the chapter explores 
themes which have emerged from prevailing policy, public and institutional debate Developments in Social Protection  39 
in search of a solution to maximise social welfare with limited resources. In some 
cases modification will result in a radical change in welfare ideology and structure. 
Targeting benefits to those families in greatest need, work incentives and job 
creation to stimulate employment, and child poverty have been the subjects of 
common debate during 1995. The information for this chapter was collated by the 
European Observatory through a 'Special Enquiry' using Observatory members to 
provide information on developments in each country. Particular attention was 
paid to changes in form and level of support for families and to the possible impact 
of convergence criteria for EMU on social security systems. 
Review of recent general changes in cash transfers to families 
The most important changes during or just prior to 1995 are discussed in the context 
of four distinct clusters: Scandinavia, the UK and Ireland, southern States and 
northern States. Each cluster of countries is considered to share similar welfare 
traditions and institutional characteristics. 
Scandinavian countries 
The distinctive pattern of the Scandinavian countries is that they extend social 
protection to all citizens as a right, in the form of entitlement to a basic amount to 
meet specific risks. Occupational schemes provide improved coverage for those 
who are employed. The system is run by a unitary administrative framework with 
local and central authorities responsible for  service provision. Unemployment 
insurance is  run separately by the unions but subsidised by the State,  (Social 
Protection in Europe p.34) The universality of benefits results in a high proportion of 
families being affected by any changes that take place. Change to cash transfers is 
largely brought about by adjusting the amount of benefit or proportional rate of 
compensation. In Finland and Sweden there has been a trend over the last few years 
to reduce cash transfers and services. In Denmark, however, a continuing effort has 
been made to improve services overall to all families and increase cash transfers 
when necessary. 
Policy debate 
Concern about the cost of social security has been the subject of political and public 
debate but families have not featured highly in this debate. Adjustments in cash 
transfers were not made in order for  the Scandinavian countries to meet their 
particular arrangements for convergence to the EMU, despite Finland and Sweden 
having  problems  with  the  criteria.  In  Finland  it  was  promised  that  Family 
Allowances would be  protected from impending cuts. The debate in Sweden  was of 
a general nature which focused on social insurance budget deficits. The common 
subject of government and public debate and academic study was undoubtedly the 
cost of social assistance which had increased considerably as a result of growth in 
the numbers of people unemployed (Ditch et al, 1997). The largest group receiving 
social assistance were, however, individuals without child dependants. In Sweden, 
there is general concern at the relationship between long-term unemployment and 
family  living  standards.  In addition,  some  concern was expressed  about the 
increasing number of immigrant families. There is a tendency to blame labour costs 
and social expenditure for Sweden's economic problems. In Denmark the debate 
also focuses on the number of people of employable age living on transfers and 
this is contributing to a growing concern about social security fraud. In Finland, 
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working party to explore ways of doing this with minimum damage to vulnerable 
groups. 
Recent changes 
Families have been protected from cut-backs in direct family benefits in  Finland and 
Denmark, whereas in Sweden the  government made sweeping cuts to Child 
Allowances. During 1995, Child Allowance in Sweden was reduced by almost 17 
per cent with especially serious consequences for large families. This family type 
suffered not only a reduction in value of benefit per child, but also income loss 
through the abolition of the special allowance for large families. In addition, an 
extra  unit of  Child  Allowance  previously claimable  for  either parent in  the 
household taking part in adult education was abolished. 
In other areas of cash transfers to cover risk, important changes have been made to 
the compensation levels of social insurance benefits in Finland and Sweden. The 
proportion of former income provided during maternity leave and the minimum 
level that was claimable has been reduced in Finland.  Whereas, by contrast, 
compensation levels have been reduced across the board in Sweden. Income while 
sick, for example, is now the employer's responsibility for the first 14 days of illness. 
Previously the qualifying period was two days. 
In Sweden some changes have been made to social assistance benefits, which are 
paid at varying rates, at the regional level. A stricter means test is now applied 
which has reduced the amounts paid for child dependents in some instances. 
Public and professional response 
Public and media support of allowances is high but of a general nature in Sweden. 
Social insurance has strong support among the population in Sweden where the 
changes have on occasion met with strong public objection. A Swedish Minister 
suggested that provision of a personal assistant for a disabled child under 16 years 
of age should be withdrawn: this was met with protests. Child Benefit is also 
popular with the public in Finland, and in Denmark most people are said to regard 
Child  Benefit  as  a  'right'  to  recompense  the  extra  costs  of  child  rearing. 
Nevertheless, the Swedish public are in favour of some cuts to Social Assistance, 
such as: targeting poorly educated mainly immigrant families with incentives to 
encourage  their  employment in private  households;  and  creating  a  national 
minimum benefit which some critics regard as being synonymous with the old 
'poor law relief'. In Finland also, the media and public debate carry overtones of 
blaming the unemployed for their own predicament, suggesting that they are lazy 
and unmotivated. At times, families with children have been accused of taking too 
much support from the State and not helping themselves. 
UK and Ireland 
Ireland and the United Kingdom are distinctive in their welfare characteristics and 
institutions.  Most benefits are flat  rate, including those covered by insurance 
contributions. The amount of benefit is normally low and extensive use is made of 
means  testing.  The  benefit  system  is  operationalized  through  an  integrated 
administrative framework of local authorities. Funding comes from employment 
contributions and general taxation (Social  Protection  in  Europe  p.34)  Changes to 
cash benefits are typically made by redefining eligibility rather than adjusting the 
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applicants,  in an attempt to  limit the number of cash losers  at  the  point of 
introduction. Consequently, some changes have had little immediate effect, but 
significant implications for later expenditure. In the UK there has been a trend over 
the last decade to reform benefits and cut public expenditure as part of general 
economic  policy.  For  some  time  resources  have  been  diverted  away  from 
pensioners  and  towards  families  with  children.  By  contrast,  successive 
governments in Ireland have increased payments annually at or above the rate of 
inflation. 
Policy debate 
In Britain, unlike Ireland, the size and growth of overall costs of social security have 
been a feature of current government debate, largely unchallenged by opposition 
parties.  Policy  initiatives have sought to identify  the faster-growing  areas  of 
spending, and deal with each of them individually. Family policy in the UK is a 
highly charged topic of debate. Ireland is less overtly concerned about the costs of 
social security and cash transfers to families have not been the subject of such 
controversial or bitter debate. Ireland has fewer problems meeting the criteria for 
convergence to the EMU, so restructuring of benefits is not linked with the process 
of convergence. The UK is opposed to entry into a Single European Currency, but 
is relatively close to meeting the criteria laid down by the Maastrich Treaty. There 
is no evidence in Britain linking cut-backs in benefit to consideration of the EMU. 
In 1995, debate in the UK featured benefits for lone parents and, less controversially, 
work incentives to help unemployed people return to the labour market. To a lesser 
degree there were debates about maintenance for  children, benefits for  those 
incapable of work and Income Support for  asylum seekers.  In Ireland debate 
focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of benefits which alleviate poverty 
rather than an attack on the policy objectives per se. 
Recent changes 
The changes in 1995 were made largely as incentives to help families back into 
the labour market and were a mixture of cut-backs and concessions. The major 
change in Irish policy was a substantial increase in Child Benefit in conjunction 
with holding child dependent allowances in social assistance static at 1994levels. In 
the UK, the in-work benefit Family Credit was redesigned to give added incentives 
to work, the child care disregard was increased, a full-time work supplement and 
a  disregard on child maintenance payments were introduced and time-limited 
targets for assessing claims for in-work benefits were established in an attempt 
to alleviate uncertainty in the process of moving into work. Other elements of 
helping people back into work include a concession of an extra four weeks Housing 
Benefit  and  Council  Tax  Benefit  for  the  long-term  unemployed,  on starting 
employment. A new 'maintenance bonus' has also been announced which will 
divert maintenance (paid while the parent with child-care responsibility is on 
Income Support) to an ear-marked fund and release it in the form of a cash bonus 
when the claimant moves into work or off welfare payments. These modifications 
are especially aimed at supporting lone parents in employment. As  part of a 
programme of equalising support for one and two parent families, cut-backs have 
been made to general and 'out of work' lone parent benefits. The universal One-
Parent Benefit and the Income Support Lone Parent Premium have been frozen at 
current levels. Finally, an habitual residence test has been included in the Income 
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benefits who re-enter Britain after living abroad for a period of time or who claim to 
be asylum seekers. 
Public and professional response 
Increases in universal Child Benefit introduced in Ireland were welcomed by 
groups representing low-income families. The general consensus is that families, 
particularly unemployed families, should receive sufficient cash benefits to enable 
them to participate in society. Children in large families were disproportionately 
represented amongst those found to be living in poverty. The increase in Child 
Benefit  was  viewed  as  alleviating  labour  market  disincentives.  Benefits  and 
concessions  to help  meet housing costs  also  have broad public and political 
support. In the UK the British  Social  Attitudes Survey  suggests that support for 
welfare spending is high in  areas of  health, education and housing rather than social 
security. Although opposition to the tone of reform discussion has come from the 
left wing and centrist policy groups (mainly with reference to lone parents), the 
main opposition party statements are broadly in line with government policy-
particularly concerning the importance of work incentives. Indeed the lack of a 
radical or distinctive policy alternative from opposition parties has itself been a 
focus of media debate and speculation. 
Southern States 
The southern States of the European Union, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have 
a mixture of fragmented, occupational and insurance based income maintenance 
schemes with relatively generous pension formulas. Gaps are covered by local and 
regional authorities which offer those with insufficient contributions discretionary 
and non-standardised help. Greece and Spain made significant changes to their 
systems of cash transfers to families in 1990, the latter country featured substantial 
increases in allowance, the introduction of an income-test and the extension of the 
scheme to the whole population not just workers. Portugal is also expecting to 
implement radical reforms to family benefits in 1996 as a consequence of a new 
agenda set by the incoming socialist government. 
Policy debate 
Concern about the cost of social security is high in all southern States. Cash trans-
fers for families with children are not, however, considered expensive and are 
consequently absent from most discussion agendas. All countries share common 
problems meeting the convergence criteria for the EMU, and this has been central 
to debates on general economic restraints. Cuts in expenditure effecting health care 
and pension schemes have inspired a growing new interest in family problems in 
Spain. Privatisation issues underlie discussions as the rightist opposition party is 
winning regional elections and preparing itself for government. Pensions are also 
regarded as a problem in Italy, whereas the family allowance system is funded from 
contributions and is not in deficit. The number of beneficiaries of the fund is in 
decline.  The  difference  between  contributions  and  payments  is  expected  to 
continue to be used to reduce deficits in other areas of assistance spending. In 
Portugal and Greece general budgetary restraints have been introduced and all 
aspects of social security are affected in the effort to diminish expenditure levels. 
Greece continues to be concerned about the increasing gap between the level of 
social protection in that country compared to other states and suggests that there is 
a strong possibility of an income-tested system for benefits, allowances and tax 
exemptions being introduced. Developments in Social Protection  43 
Recent changes 
So far families have been protected from cuts in cash transfers in 1995. In Spain, 
Greece and Portugal family allowances did not change in 1995, although in the 
first two countries and to some extent in the latter, their value continues to be 
eroded by the effects of inflation. In Italy, 1995 was seen as a positive year for the 
family and restructuring has led to benefit increases, particularly for large and one 
parent families. Selectivity, by means of income testing, has been introduced into 
the Italian salaried worker's scheme and lone parent families were targeted for a 25 
per cent increase in December 1995. No allowance is now paid to a two person 
household unless it is a lone parent household or household with a disabled family 
member. Previously 91 per cent of beneficiaries of family benefits were two person 
households. In the fiscal system an increase in tax allowance for a dependent spouse 
favours low earners. In addition numerous changes have been made to regional acts 
in the field of social protection, for example, the introduction of birth or adoption 
allowances based on voluntary contributions; studentships for young people in 
economic hardship; and income-tested care-giving benefits for families who care 
for a disabled or elderly person at home. 
Public and professional response 
In general, debate by public and professionals on the subject of cash transfers has 
not been a highly charged issue. Cash transfers are low so they tend to only emerge 
in debate about other issues, such as demographic problems. 
Northern States 
Germany, Austria, France and the Benelux countries base their social protection on 
insurance principles, where benefits are mostly related  to  earnings and con-
tributions sometimes vary by occupational group. Gaps in support are covered by 
social assistance schemes. Financing is generally through contributions but The 
Netherlands has departed  from  this  tradition by introducing some universal 
schemes, (Social Protection in Europe p. 34). Changes in cash transfers are brought 
about by adjustment to eligibility rules and the level or proportion of compensation 
claimable from insurance funds. There is a broad consensus in northern States that 
families with children are substantially supported. Belgium for example, has one of 
the most generous cash transfer systems. Political debate in Austria for many years 
concentrated on how best to improve the situation of families with children. France 
has an explicit family policy. The Netherlands has a family based system in which 
the 'breadwinner' receives substantial support through the taxation system. The 
Luxembourg government, following its health reforms of the 1990s, absorbs an 
increasing proportion of insurance deficit, and funds an increasing number of 
benefits from general taxation in a bid to keep contributions reasonable and stable. 
In 1993, the disposable incomes of families on modest and average incomes in 
Luxembourg were improved by an increase in most benefits and a change in the 
eligibility rules for child-rearing allowances. 
Policy debate 
In northern States social security expenditures have been the subject of highly 
charged debate (with the exception of Luxembourg1). Concern about the cost of 
1 Luxembourg's social expenditure has increased but the government is committed to finding a solution 
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cash transfers to families, however, is not a central feature of this debate, except in 
France where, during the 1995 Presidential campaign, the issue was much to the 
fore. When the  Juppe government announced that family allowance would  be liable 
to taxation, demonstrations and protests took place in the provinces. 
Overall, the issue of meeting the criteria for convergence to the EMU and its 
relationship to either cut-back or restructuring of benefits in the different countries 
generated a  mixed response.  Luxembourg meets the convergence criteria but 
believes that to discuss the issue is unhealthy because it damages the credibility of 
countries with their neighbours. The criteria for convergence are unlikely to be met 
in The Netherlands. Efforts to deal with severe general expenditure restraints were 
met with cut-backs in direct support and by privatisation in various systems of 
social insurance. The present universal benefits are almost seen as 'taboo' in today's 
economic climate.  In Germany, although EMU entry requirements do require 
economy measures, savings were made in other welfare areas and by transferring 
the responsibility and costs of administering the direct cash transfer system to 
employers. 
In 1995 there were other important debates taking place in northern States of the 
EU.  The ratio of economically active to non-active population was a prominent 
topic for debate in The Netherlands in 1995. Luxembourg debated abandoning the 
contribution system for funding Family Benefits in favour of a fully funded state 
system. Germany's major debate concerned changing the eligibility criteria for the 
'Married Person's Split Arrangements'. Criteria is by marriage and applies whether 
there are children present or not. It is a substantial allowance and restricting it to 
married or unmarried couples with dependent children would have a major impact 
on the budget deficit but could breach Germany's constitution. Austria debated the 
subject of income-testing benefits in a  system hindered by taxation based on 
individual income rather than household incomes. Finally, in France, the focus of 
debate has moved from family issues to health issues, in view of a serious deficit in 
the Health Insurance Funds. 
Recent changes 
Cash transfers to families with children were protected from cut-backs in Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Germany changed their dual system of tax relief 
and  Child  Benefit  to  an optional  system  administered by private  firms;  tax 
thresholds were increased by tax exemption of the minimum existence level for 
raising  children;  the  level  of child  benefit and/  or  tax  free  allowances  were 
increased; and in an aberration from traditional policy, a universal system of child 
benefit replaced the former income-tested system.  Belgium, Luxembourg and 
France made no changes in cash transfers in 1995. France had a presidential election 
campaign which provoked a great deal of controversial debate on family policy but 
no changes were implemented in 1995, with the exception of the introduction of a 
new tax equivalent to half a per cent of total income for all employees to help 
balance the social security budget. 
The Netherlands and Austria, however, made substantial cuts in 1995.  Austria 
reduced cash transfers to families by  a simple cut in the level of family allowance for 
each child. In addition, the eligibility criteria for parental leave were tightened and 
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Netherlands also reduced child allowances by 20 per cent which meant the average 
family would lose considerable income.  There was also an increase in health 
insurance contributions and in the 'Ecotax' contribution to the employment fund. 
The burden placed on large families by the reductions was offset somewhat by an 
extra child fee added to the individual Housing Allowance. 
Public and professional response 
The Juppe plan proposed very controversial measures relating to reform of family 
benefits in France, causing much debate among specialists and more widely. One 
issue of debate was the choice between making family allowances liable to tax or 
subject to means testing. The subject of means-testing or income-testing universal 
benefits or alternatively greater selectivity through the tax system, is also the subject 
of media and academic debate in Belgium and Austria. In addition, a tougher stand 
is  being  taken  by  other  social  partners  in  France,  such  as,  employer's 
representatives and trade union organisations who battled to influence the future 
shape of social security, including family policy. However French, Austrian, and 
German employers do not consider it their responsibility to fund family policy. 
Various measures by governments of the respective countries have increased the 
costs and burden of administering cash transfers to private enterprise or non-state 
agencies. Employers argue the current trend penalises employment by increasing 
labour costs. 
The cost of social assistance is generally more controversial than other elements of 
the  social  security  budget.  In  Germany  the  topic  has  strong  family  policy 
implications as families make up the majority of beneficiaries. In other countries 
these families are disproportionately composed of lone parents and immigrant 
families. This raises issues with the media, professionals and academics about the 
implications for children of living for long periods of time in poverty. The budget 
cuts in The Netherlands were particularly devastating for those who raise children 
on low incomes. However, this was not a matter of great media and public debate 
as average family incomes are high and child allowances considered as 'extras'. 
An organisation of church-related welfare groups established a media presence 
called 'The poor side of the Netherlands' and in a report to Government in 1995 
stimulated some public and political debate. 
Targeting benefits 
The issue of 'targeting' benefits as a  means of allocating scarce resources has 
received widespread attention in the EU during 1995. The concept of targeting has 
variable meaning: in general terms, 'vertical targeting' involves greater use of 
means-testing by linking the amount of benefit received to household income and/ 
or assets or clawing back benefits via the tax system from those on higher incomes. 
Vertical  targeting  has  the  advantage  of  controlling  expenditure  levels  while 
increasing the effectiveness  of limited  resources.  Horizontal targeting directs 
benefits,  on  a  categorical  basis,  to  particular  groups  within  the  population 
irrespective of their income. 
The progressive tax system is a traditional method of vertical targeting, favouring 
the disposable incomes of modest and average families. Some countries such as 
Luxembourg operate a  dual tax and benefit system such that an increase in 
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dependent children increases the disposable incomes of families on modest and 
average incomes. However the taxation of family benefits is generally unpopular. 
In France the suggestion caused demonstrations in the provinces and opposition 
from  the  Trades  Unions  and  Family  Organisations.  The  Juppe  government 
subsequently abandoned the notion of taxing universal benefits for the 'well off' in 
favour of means testing the less 'well off'. Means-testing, in this instance, takes the 
form of assessing income according to family size and work status and counting 
other benefits (such as Maternity Allowance and Incapacity Allowance) as income. 
The French commentator Dufourcq (1994) believes 'the current swing away from 
an insurance-based system towards a welfare model based on social solidarity is a 
major political event'. 
The allocation of benefits by  means testing is well established in the UK and Ireland. 
There are many  limitations: non-take-up of benefits is relatively high; there are high 
levels of fraud, weak legitimacy and complexity of means-test; and generally they 
are more damaging to work incentives than universal benefits paid to worker and 
non-workers alike.  However, there are those who argue that targeting family 
benefits specifically to families in special circumstances rewards them for being in 
that position. Examples often cited include lone parents, unemployed people on 
social assistance and those living in municipal housing. 
Targeting, particularly by means testing, may contribute to fraudulent claims. In 
the UK, fraud on the part of claimants is thought to be most common when paid 
work is not being declared or when cohabiting mothers claim as lone parents. In 
Ireland too, fraud is a major policy issue. Fraud is also a problem for insurance 
based schemes; for example, German absentee rates are said to be particularly high. 
In Portugal a small survey found that 75 per cent of managers receiving sickness 
benefits were not ill. In Sweden the reduction in social insurance compensation was 
aimed specifically at reducing rates of sickness claims. Workers faced with lower 
levels of compensation were absent less frequently. Employers facing greater costs 
through absenteeism tried to encourage workers to stay at work by improving the 
health and safety conditions. 
The link between selectivity, especially by means testing or horizontal targeting, 
and weaker legitimacy of benefit and negative attitudes of users is highlighted 
by  the  Belgian  debate.  The  discussion  centres  around  advantages  of  the 
universal nature of support which allocates benefits as a  right to all families. 
Because higher income families also receive benefits, distribution to lower income 
families  is  politically  and socially  acceptable  and the  system remains  stable. 
Conversely, when the 'rights' of 'well off' families to benefits are challenged they 
have a powerful platform from which to promote their cause. Arguably, in the UK 
(Ditch et al1993), the attempts to reduce the value of Child Benefit in 1980 and 1987 
failed because of public opinion. A similar situation arose in France, Denmark and 
Sweden. 
In many EU countries the link between fertility and targeting of benefits has been a 
subject of concern. There is no evidence presented that Child Benefit or policies 
which seek to equalise the burden of  child care has any effect on decreasing fertility 
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Allowances,  Parental  Leave  Schemes,  Home  Child  Care  Allowances  and 
progressive systems of Child Benefit is believed to encourage people to have 
children. At the same time pro-natalist policies contribute substantially to  the 
income of unemployed and low-earning families while contributing relatively 
insignificant amounts towards the upbringing of children in 'well off' families. For 
lone parents and those with large families the amount of cash transfer is often 
considerably higher than would be the case in two parent families. Consequently, 
the advantage of increasing their family size is greater. In both Ireland and the UK 
there was extensive media debate about the alleged behaviour of unmarried 
mothers who were thought to have had children as a means of securing income. 
Feminist politicians in Austria have been critical of policies, such as parental leave, 
for fear of encouraging mothers 'back into the kitchen' with all the risks associated 
with long-term detachment from  the  labour market.  In Greece  concern  was 
expressed at the lack of services and the low level of cash benefits which are 
believed to contribute to the decline in the fertility rate. In France, to some extent, 
the birth rate issue is obscured by the economic crisis. Nevertheless, demographers, 
the Union National Association for Families and the Confederation of Christian 
Workers regularly speak out  against a lack of targeting measures to encourage a rise 
in  the  birth  rate.  Similarly,  Conservative  politicians  responded  to  Austria's 
cutbacks in family benefits in 1995 with expressions of concern about low fertility 
rates. 
In the southern States of the EU, there is little debate about targeting or selectivity 
of benefits but a pervasive belief that benefits should go to those who need them 
most. The new Socialist government in Portugal is committed to an improvement in 
the efficiency with which benefits are targeted to families and the provision of a 
Guaranteed Minimum Income for all. Trade unions naturally support universal 
benefits as a  'right' for  all  but concede  that selectivity by income  testing  as 
acceptable in certain circumstances. 
Incentives to employment 
Throughout 1995  the EU  exhorted Member States to strengthen the economic 
recovery by reducing unemployment through the process of employment creation 
(European Economy 1995).  Prevailing high levels of long-term unemployment 
arise because of a lack of jobs, mis-match of jobs to the available pool of potential 
workers and in some cases as a result of barriers to employment built into social 
security systems. Incentives to employment involve governments in moving from 
a passive to an active approach towards unemployed people. In financial terms 
incentives are designed to remove barriers to employment such as poverty traps 
which make people worse off in low paid work than in receipt of benefits. The wider 
discussion in Europe as reported by Observatory members involves ideas about 
creating or improving the 'employability' of unemployed people, often using 
coercive  methods.  In today's climate emphasis is  placed on the provision of 
training, job creation and insistence that opportunities to  work are taken up, 
thereby removing elements of free choice from the unemployed. In the UK the key 
area of debate was about the 'evils of benefit dependency' which stimulated 
discussion on work incentives. Recent empirical evidence however, suggests that 
social security benefits may be a factor in prolonging unemployment albeit less 
significant!  y than has previous!  y been suggested. This effect rna  y be greater for lone 
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when they are.  In some instances families with children are the focus of debate. In 
a number of countries (Germany, Austria, The Netherlands), there is anxiety about 
whether coming generations with a reduced number of workers can afford to 
finance the growing dependent population of elderly people. Pro-natalist policies, 
which encourage women of child bearing age out of the market, sometimes for 
extended periods of time, act as disincentives to seek employment. 
Reducing the level/value of social security benefits to unemployed people is a 
highly charged debate. In Germany it is about re-establishing the 'gap' requirement 
of Federal Social Assistance Laws, between social assistance benefits and those 
earning the minimum wage (Ditch et  al,  1997).  Stricter means-tests have been 
applied in many countries. In the UK  the new Jobseeker's Allowance has no 
dependants allowances included in the benefit and it only lasts for six months 
whereas Unemployment Benefit was available for  one year. In Ireland income 
support child dependant allowances have not risen in line with inflation and are to 
be reduced in duration. In Sweden, a discussion about the requirement to perform 
tasks in exchange for social assistance met strong opposition from the business 
sector who argue that this would harm supply, demand and prices in the market 
place. 
An adverse change in the eligibility criteria for social assistance is another method 
of creating incentives for  some groups to return to the labour market. In The 
Netherlands unmarried mothers with children under school age are now obliged to 
apply for jobs. In the UK, there have been attempts to create incentives for lone 
parents through changes to the in-work benefit (Family Credit), by tackling the 
problem of child care, addressing the uncertainty of moving off benefits and other 
anxieties of mothers trying to reconcile family life with work. 
The active creation of jobs for people with poor qualifications in The Netherlands 
and Sweden is aimed largely at immigrant families who need additional help to 
enter  the  labour  market  and  who  form  a  disproportionate  number  of  the 
unemployed population. In both  countries, concern has been expressed at the use of 
state subsidies for employees in private households. 
Conclusion 
For some years there has been a continuing debate, more vociferous in some 
countries than in others, about both the cost and form of support for families. 
Unemployment rates, which continue at a high level, together with policies to limit 
(if not reduce) the proportion of state expenditure committed to social protection 
have been joined by renewed concern over rising levels of family poverty. The 
relationship between family policies and social protection within a framework of 
uncertainty about the prospects for, and implications of, economic and monetary 
union becomes more complicated:  traditional assumptions about general and 
generous support for all families, irrespective of income, are being questioned even 
in countries such as France where family values are a basis for public policy are 
(arguably) deepest. 
There is less evidence than expected of a widespread and significant impact on 
families with dependent children prospective of policy change in France, Germany, 
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There is greater sensitivity about the costs and (alleged) behavioural affect of 
social assistance than about either insurance or categorical benefits. It is for this 
reason  that in  those  countries  where  the  proportion  of  families  depend  on 
assistance benefits is high, such as the UK (and to a lesser extent Ireland and 
Sweden) there have been orchestrated examples of 'scapegoating', expecially of 
the unemployed, lone parents and immigrants. All in all, the rhetoric of debate 
has been more threatening than the substance of policy: however, the writing may 
be on the wall. CHAPTER FOUR 
Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies 
Introduction 
Every country in the European Union has a set of national tax and benefit policies 
which have an impact on the living standards of families. This chapter examines 
the impact of these policies. It begins with a comparison of the latest available 
comparable information on the outcomes of tax and benefit policies on family 
incomes by exploring poverty and the distribution of income. This is followed by a 
comparative analysis of the 1995 tax and benefit package for families using the 
model families method developed in previous comparative studies by the Social 
Policy Research Unit. 
Poverty and living standards 
The 1994 Report of the Observatory (Ditch et al, 1996) presented some comparative 
data on the prevalence of poverty in the then nine EU countries that had been 
derived by Eurostat working on national income and expenditure surveys for the 
late 1980s. The analysis below draws on original analysis of the latest 'third wave' 
of the Luxembourg Income Survey which has just become available. It has the 
advantage of providing more up-to-date data than the Eurostat work but the 
disadvantage that the data are not available for all the EU countries. By May 1996 
there were 21 countries with data available for circa 1990 (see Bradshaw and Chen, 
1997). However the data set for Austria still had problems of reliability and was 
excluded. There were data for nine other EU countries and these are included in 
this comparison. 
Table 4.1 summarises the sources of the data. The results relate to the situation in 
the countries for the years given-between 1990 and 1992. 
Previous comparative research on the distribution of income (Mitchell, 1991; 
Buhmann et al,  1988; EU, 1996; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) have shown that 
results are sensitive to the poverty standard, the unit of  analysis and the equivalence 
scale used. This analysis is restricted to single unit households except for some 
countries which treat families with an unmarried child over 18 as a single unit. 
These households are included in the 'other' category in the following tables. The 
equivalence scale used to adjust household income to differences in needs is almost 
identical to the 'Whiteford average' (1985)  and is the adaptation of the OECD 
equivalence scale used in recent comparative work by the EU (Hagenaars et  al, 
1994) (1.00 for the first adult, 0.55 for the second adult and subsequent adults[s] 
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Table 4.1: Data sources for the third wave LIS data sets and UK FES 
Country  Year 
Belgium  1992 
Denmark  1992 
Germany  1989 
Spain  1990 
Italy  1991 
Netherlands  1991 
Finland  1991 
Sweden  1992 
United Kingdom  1991 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
*Crown Copyright (1996). 
Survey Name  Sample Size 
The Living Conditions of Households  3821 
Income Distribution Survey  12895 
The German Socio-Economic Panel  4690 
Expenditure and Income Survey  21153 
The Bank of Italy Income Survey  8188 
Socio-Economic Panel  4378 
Survey of Income Distribution  11749 
Income Distribution Survey  12484 
The Family Expenditure Survey*  7056 
and 0.35 for each child). In fact, as Buhmann et al  (1988) have shown, aggregate 
poverty rates are not particularly sensitive to the equivalence scale used, though 
the composition of the group defined as poor may be affected. 
Results are certainly sensitive to the poverty standard employed. The bulk of this 
analysis uses the conventional standard of below 50 per cent of average (mean not 
median) equivalent income. However the sensitivity of the results to that threshold 
is explored later. 
Table 4.2 compares the risk of poverty before the impact of direct taxes and social 
security benefits, that is original or factor income including occupational pensions 
and private transfers. Sweden has the highest pre-transfer risk of poverty and 
Finland the lowest. It  is not surprising that in all countries elderly people have the 
highest risk of poverty before transfers. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
both have very high risks of poverty among lone parents pre-transfer. 
Table 4.2: Households below 50% average income before social security benefit 
and direct taxation, circa 1990 
Country  Aged  Aged  Single  Couple  Lone  Couple  Other  Total 
single  couple  noch  noch  parent  w/ch 
Belgium  99.6  88.4  35.5  24.9  36.0  12.2  42.6  38.3 
Denmark  78.0  62.7  42.4  13.0  43.3  11.0  23.4  36.9 
Germany  74.8  68.8  22.1  13.2  40.3  11.6  32.9  32.7 
Spain  91.4  74.4  42.7  22.9  30.3  12.5  39.4  33.1 
Italy  80.2  53.3  25.6  15.9  4.9  10.5  26.8  27.2 
Netherlands  74.2  65.8  41.9  15.5  72.7  10.4  28.8  33.0 
Finland  59.5  38.4  30.1  8.7  30.6  11.9  24.5  24.6 
Sweden  95.9  81.1  37.9  10.6  32.0  10.4  0.0  41.4 
United Kingdom  83.9  68.2  36.2  13.2  78.6  19.9  35.8  38.1 Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  53 
However, the post-transfer situation is more significant. The analysis here is 
restricted to the impact of social security benefits and direct taxation including social 
security contributions. Excluded from consideration here are the impacts of housing 
benefits and subsidies, indirect taxes and the value of services in kind. There are 
strong arguments (Smeeding et al, 1993; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) that these 
should be taken into account in a thorough comparative analysis of the effectiveness 
of redistribution. There is also an argument (Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) about 
whether social security contributions should be treated as a deduction from earnings 
on the grounds that, at least in part, they are a form of deferred income. 
The impact of social security benefits and direct taxes on market income is shown 
in Table 4.3. The UK now has the highest proportion of households in poverty overall. 
The figure of 23.0 per cent of poor households is nearly double the average for all 
countries. This figure is equivalent to the 21.7 per cent of  individuals living in families 
with incomes less than 50 per cent of the contemporary average (before housing 
Table 4.3: Households below 50% average income after social security benefit 
and direct taxation 
Country  Aged  Aged  Single  Couple  Lone  Couple  Other  Total 
single  couple  no ch  noch  parent  w/ch 
Belgium  12.4  11.4  9.2  5.1  9.4  4.7  6.2  7.1 
Denmark  8.8  2.8  17.7  2.7  6.5  3.1  4.7  8.2 
Germany  21.7  12.9  21.7  16.3  34.2  12.1  16.9  17.5 
Spain  16.3  20.8  23.5  12.2  27.7  15.0  17.1  16.0 
Italy  9.0  4.1  7.4  7.8  4.9  14.6  11.6  9.6 
Netherlands  3.8  7.6  18.1  5.6  27.4  8.0  5.4  9.3 
Finland  23.1  3.0  18.5  3.6  6.3  2.8  5.4  9.6 
Sweden  9.6  0.7  18.3  2.0  2.6  2.9  0.0  9.1 
United Kingdom  46.5  30.4  23.5  8.9  51.8  17.5  17.8  23.0 
Table 4.4: Poverty reduction 
Country  Pre-transfer rate  Post-transfer  Reduction 
%  %  % 
Belgium  38.3  7.1  81.5 
Denmark  36.9  8.2  77.8 
Spain  33.1  16.0  51.7 
Italy  27.2  9.6  64.7 
Netherlands  33.0  9.3  71.8 
Finland  24.6  9.6  61.0 
Sweden  41.4  9.1  78.0 
United Kingdom  38.1  23.0  39.6 54  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
costs) estimated in the HBAI figures for 1990/1991 (DSS,  1993) i.e. the small 
difference is a function of our choice of households rather than individuals. 
Post-transfer poverty rates are a consequence of the level of pre-transfer poverty 
rates, the level of social transfers and the redistributive force of the system of direct 
taxation in each country. After transfers the UK has the highest poverty rate for 
each household group (except for Spain in the case of childless couples and couples 
with children and Germany for childless couples). 
Poverty reduction 
The following two tables compare the performance of different countries in reducing 
poverty. Of the nine countries Belgium is the most successful, reducing over 80 per 
cent of pre-transfer poverty. The UK is least successful reducing only 39.6 per cent 
of its pre-transfer poverty. Table 4.5 compares the poverty reduction achieved for 
different household types. There are some interesting variations between countries 
in the effectiveness of their transfers for different groups. Thus, for example, the 
Nordic countries achieve very high reduction rates for all groups except the single 
childless. In Italy and Spain the tax/benefit system leaves couples with children 
worse off, because income tax exceeds social benefits overall. The UK is relatively 
unsuccessful in reducing pre transfer poverty for all groups but in particular lone 
parents and couples with children. 
Table 4.5: Poverty reduction by family type 
Country  Aged  Aged  Single  Couple  Lone  Couple  Other  Total 
single  couple  no ch  no ch  parent  w/ch 
Belgium  87.6  87.1  74.1  79.5  73.9  61.5  85.4  81.5 
Denmark  88.7  95.5  58.3  79.2  85.0  71.8  79.9  77.8 
Germany  71.0  81.3  1.8  -23.5  15.1  -4.3  48.6  46.5 
Spain  82.2  72.0  45.0  46.7  8.6  -20.0  56.6  51.7 
Italy  88.8  92.3  71.1  50.9  0.0  -39.0  56.7  64.7 
Netherlands  94.9  88.4  56.8  63.9  62.3  23.1  81.3  71.8 
Finland  61.2  92.2  38.5  58.6  79.4  76.5  78.0  61.0 
Sweden  90.0  99.1  51.7  81.1  91.9  72.1  0.0  78.0 
United Kingdom  44.6  55.4  35.1  32.6  34.1  12.1  50.3  39.6 
Composition of the poor 
Table 4.6 explores the composition of the poor after transfers and shows that there 
are considerable variations between countries. In  the UK there is a greater proportion 
of single elderly people than any other country together with relatively high 
proportions of lone parents. In all the Nordic countries the majority of the poor are 
single (young) people. In Finland there is a high proportion of single elderly people 
(but not elderly couples) and in Spain and Italy couples with children represent 
over 40 per cent of the poor. Table 4.7 compares the gender of the head of poor 
households. Spain has the highest proportion of poor households headed by a male 
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Table 4.6: Composition of poor households at 50% average income after social 
security benefit and direct taxation 
Country  Aged  Aged  Single  Couple  Lone  Couple  Other  Total 
single  couple  no ch  noch  parent  w/ch 
Belgium  18.0  18.6  14.0  20.2  4.3  20.5  4.5  100 
Denmark  16.2  3.0  61.7  6.9  3.5  7.4  1.2  100 
Germany  21.0  8.1  25.7  22.4  4.3  14.5  3.9  100 
Spain  6.5  19.7  5.3  15.9  1.7  40.1  10.7  100 
Italy  9.0  5.8  5.0  26.5  0.4  42.1  11.2  100 
Netherlands  4.9  7.7  37.2  16.2  9.1  23.3  1.6  100 
Finland  29.6  2.1  46.9  8.2  2.5  7.6  3.1  100 
Sweden  16.1  0.8  72.6  3.4  1.4  5.8  0.0  100 
United Kingdom  26.7  14.7  14.1  9.8  10.4  18.9  5.4  100 
Table 4.7:  Characteristics of poor households 
Country 
Sex of  Head 
HH with child  HHwithaged 
Male  Female 
Belgium  71.0  29.0  25.3  39.4 
Denmark  56.3  43.7  11.2  19.3 
Germany  60.3  39.7  19.4  32.5 
Spain  78.2  21.8  46.5  35.8 
Italy  78.2  21.8  44.8  18.7 
Netherlands  66.8  33.2  33.0  13.0 
Finland  43.3  56.7  10.3  34.1 
Sweden  52.7  47.3  7.2  17.0 
United Kingdom  57.9  42.1  31.2  44.1 
Sensitivity of the poverty threshold 
In this analysis, below 50 per cent of average equivalent income has been used as 
the poverty standard. However, if alternative thresholds had been employed there 
would have been some variation in the post-transfer poverty rates found in different 
countries. If the 60 per cent threshold had been used instead, tThe Netherlands 
would have moved up two positions above Italy and Finland (with comparatively 
higher poverty rates) and Sweden would have moved below Denmark and Germany 
below Spain (with comparatively lower poverty rates). Apart from these countries 
the rankings would have been similar to the 50 per cent threshold. If  the 40 per cent 
threshold had been used Germany, Denmark and Sweden would have had relatively 
higher poverty rates than with the 50 per cent threshold. Indeed Germany would 
have overtaken the UK as the country with the highest post-transfer poverty rates 
(however we are still anxious about the LIS data for Germany as there appears to 
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analysis that the 50 per cent threshold is for most countries a fairly robust 
representation of relative overall poverty except at the very lowest threshold. 
However, the composition of the poor, and the risks of poverty for different groups, 
may still be sensitive to the threshold employed. 
If  housing costs, services in kind and indirect taxes were taken into account there is 
some evidence from previous comparative analyses that positions would alter 
(Saunders, 1992; Smeeding, 1993; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995). Ramprakash (1994) 
also found that if household expenditure is used instead of income then some 
countries have comparatively lower poverty rates. Similarly, if other elements of 
poverty had been included -poverty gaps, degrees of inequality among the poor 
or some kind of aggregate measure of poverty as measured by Sen (1979)  there 
would have been some changes in the overall picture (Forster, 1993; Mitchell, 1991). 
Nevertheless all the comparisons indicate that some countries are doing rather better 
than others in mitigating their pre-transfer poverty rates. 
Readers are advised to consult the companion volume for detail on developments 
in respect of poverty and living standards in individual countries. Poverty was 
reported as increasing in eight of the Member States during 1995. Inequality rates 
increased in Sweden, and a UK report (Barclay, 1994) commented on the damage to 
the social fabric caused by high rates of poverty. Greek consumers experienced a 
fall in the standard of living, and government expenditure on families was cut in 
Portugal. In Austria, despite generous benefit provision, certain families have a 
high risk of poverty, and this is also true in Denmark, where families with parents 
aged over 50 or under 20 are especially affected. Unemployment, and long-term 
dependence on  benefits are major causes of poverty in Germany, Ireland and France. 
Poverty is not, of course, determined only by market forces, international 
competition or other external factors which affect the primary distribution but also 
by social and fiscal policies. In the following section we consider the outcome of 
these policies. 
The model families comparisons 
Model families are used to allow comparisons to be made of the value and structure 
of the 'packages' of cash benefits, taxes and services and charges that contribute 
towards altering the distribution of market incomes in different countries. The 
members of the Observatory complete a 'matrix' which summarises what a number 
of selected family types, in specific circumstances and with given earnings levels, 
would receive in May 1995 in each country. This enables us to compare how the 
transfer system operates in different countries. 
The approach has been used for a number of comparative studies at York. It was 
initially developed for a comparative study of child benefit packages in initially 15, 
later 18 countries (Bradshaw et al, 1993; Stevens and Bradshaw, 1995; Bradshaw 
and Uzuhashi, 1994). It  was later adapted to compare the incentive structures facing 
married women engaged in housework (Shaver and Bradshaw, 1995), lone parents 
(Whiteford and Bradshaw, 1994), and social assistance schemes in OECD countries 
(Eardley et al, 1996). It was used for the first time in the 1994 report of the Observatory 
(Ditch et al, 1996) and in the special study of lone parents labour supply undertaken 
that year (Bradshaw et al, 1996). Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  57 
The methods employed and the assumptions made were discussed and critically 
evaluated in the 1994 Observatory report (Ditch et al, 1996) and will not be repeated 
here1• In summary, in simulating the impact of national policies on model families, 
in order to compare like with like, a number of choices have to be made. These 
relate to family type; family earnings; the number and ages of the children; housing 
costs; the treatment of local taxes; health costs; school costs and benefits; and the 
type and costs of pre-school provision. The assumptions that have to be made are 
essential to the task of obtaining comparable information on an up-to-date basis. 
The results obtained inevitably describe the way the system should work rather 
then necessarily how it does work. Thus the comparisons assume that those eligible 
for income-related benefits are claiming their entitlement, despite the fact that the 
take-up of those benefits is known to be far from complete in some countries. The 
more assumptions that are made about the circumstances of the model families, 
the less representative those families will be of actual populations. This is the 
inevitable cost of achieving comparability and comparability is arguably a more 
important quality in comparative research than accurate representation. The model 
families are not likely to exist in all their characteristics in any country: they are 
illustrative, not representative. In illustrating a range of experiences they enable us 
to demonstrate and compare the tax/benefit environment implicitly created for 
families in a variety of circumstances in the EU countries. New data on the size and 
Table 4.8: Number of earners per household, families with children 
(% of hJh type) 
Country  Lone parents  I  Couples 
None  1  I  None  1  2 
Belgium  45  55  8  29  63 
Denmark  31  69  4  22  74 
Germany  30  70  4  40  56 
Greece  33  67  7  54  39 
Spain  39  61  10  60  30 
France  29  71  8  42  50 
Ireland  77  23  20  52  28 
Italy  39  61  7  51  42 
Luxembourg  24  76  3  50  47 
Netherlands  64  36  6  46  48 
Austria  - - - - -
Portugal  30  69  3  34  63 
Finland  - - - - -
Sweden  - - - - -
UK  59  41  12  30  58 
Source: Eurostat, initial results from ECHP 
1 A working paper on the methodology adopted will be available (from mid 1997), on request, from 
the coordination team. 58  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
composition of households which have become available recently from the European 
Community Household Panel and which are discussed in Chapter Three, enable 
an assessment of the relevance of the model family types from country to country. 
For example, Table 4.8 shows the number of earners in lone parent and couple 
households with dependent children. It shows for example that the lone parent 
with one earner "case" is much more prevalent in Luxembourg and France than it 
is in Ireland, The Netherlands and the UK and couple families with two earners are 
least common in Ireland and Spain. 
One assumption that has to be made concerns earnings. No entirely satisfactory 
and comparable earnings data are available. The earnings figures used in the model 
families matrix analysis are presented in Table 4.9. They are derived for 1993 from 
the OECD Annual Report on the Tax Benefit Position of Production Workers 1990-
1993 (OECD, 1994) updated from 1993 to May 1995 using the index of hourly 
earnings in manufacturing industries in the latest version of Main Economic 
Indicators, (OECD), 1995. These figures refer to all production workers, and so 
estimates of average male and female earnings in manufacturing industries were 
derived using the International Labour Office (1994) and data on the usual number 
of hours worked using Eurostat data. 
Table 4.9:  Average gross male and female earnings, in local currencies and 
purchasing power parities £ sterling, per month, May 1995 
Male  Female 
Country  Local  ppp=£1  Value in  Local  Value in  Average female 
currency  ppps£  currency  ppps£  earnings as % 
sterling  sterling  of average 
male earnings 
Belgium  BFr  73606  57.87  1272  50788  878  69 
Denmark  DK  20608  13.94  1528  17334  1243  84 
Germany  DM  4931  3.23  1527  3257  1008  66 
Greece  Dr  220111  327.16  673  172087  526  78 
Spain  p  182854  192.90  948  124341  644  68 
France  FF  10552  10.28  1026  7914  770  75 
Ireland  Ir  1278  0.98  1252  822  806  64 
Italy  L  2523000*  2450.62  1030*  1993939  813  79 
Luxembourg  F  84253*  62.19  1355*  76505  1230  91 
Netherlands  G  5003  3.29  1521  3213  977  64 
Austria  APf  26439*  21.76  1215  18568*  853  70 
Portugal  Esc  118799  188.27  631  92516  491  78 
Finland  FM  11074  963.00  1149  8671  891  78 
Sweden  SEK  16585  15.59  1064  12823  823  77 
United Kingdom  £  1466  1.00  1466  804  804  55 
• These countries provided alternative earnings estimates using national data sources. Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  59 
The level of earnings are broadly what  might be expected, given the level of economic 
development of the countries. There are perhaps three exceptions to this: Sweden, 
Finland and France, which all have lower earnings than might be expected. This is 
perhaps a function of the fact that each of these countries has a substantial 'social 
wage' delivered via employer social security contributions. It may also be the case 
that purchasing power parities at the aggregate level are not very successful in 
picking up the relative cost of living in these countries. The female earnings given 
(for the first time this year) take account of variation in hours supplied between 
countries and are therefore arguably a better representation of actual average female 
earnings. It can be seen that there is a good deal of variation in the ratio of female to 
male earnings between countries with, for example, female earnings varying from 
of 55 per cent of males in the UK to 84 per cent in Denmark. 
In order to compare the living standards of families at different earnings levels the 
Observatory members were asked to calculate the impact of taxes and benefits on 
five different earnings levels and for families with no earnings or social insurance 
income, receiving payments under minimum income guarantees or social assistance 
arrangements. From these earnings figures income tax payable by a given family 
was deducted. Then the social security contributions required to be paid by  a given 
family at those earnings was deducted including all compulsory statutory 
contributions whether they fund social security entitlements, health entitlements 
or other things. The test is that they are required of employees by the state. This 
gives post tax income. Then non-income related and income-related cash benefits 
that may be made to a given family at a given income level are added. These are 
mainly family allowances or child benefits, but in some countries social assistance 
may be payable to low earners and lone parents may be entitled to child support 
maintenance or alimony. This is included if there is a scheme for advancing at least 
some of the payments due from public funds irrespective of the compliance of the 
absent parent. At this stage we also make assumptions about health costs. The base 
line assumption is that health care is provided free of charge and that its quality 
and availability are equal between countries. Then we price what families might 
be actually required to pay for a standard package of health care. At this stage 
account is also taken of the costs or value of free or subsidised pre-school provision 
and the costs/benefits of schooling. This gives income post-net benefits. 
One of the most problematic aspects of this methodology relates to the treatment of 
housing costs. Tenure patterns vary between countries. Table 4.10 is based on the 
European Household Panel Survey and shows for example that for couples with 
children the proportion who rent varies from 49 per cent in Germany to 14 per cent 
in Spain. In contrast, lone parent families are more likely to rent with the proportion 
varying from 83 per cent in Germany to 33 per cent in Greece. As well as tenure 
housing costs vary within countries according to a host of factors-direct and indirect 
subsidies, geographical location, the size and age of the dwelling, length of 
occupation and many other factors. 
It would be easiest to ignore housing costs altogether. However, housing costs and 
housing subsidies are in many countries an important element of family policy and 
to ignore them altogether would be to misrepresent the impact of that policy. Because 
of the difficulties involved results are presented both  before and after housing costs. 
Local property based taxes used to fund local services are also taken into account at 60  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Table 4.10:  Percentage in each housing tenure, by household type 
Country 
All households 
Own  Rent  Rent-free 
Belgium  66  31  3 
Denmark  56  44  0 
Germany  47  51  2 
Greece  76  20  4 
Spain  78  16  6 
France  53  42  5 
Ireland  79  19  2 
Italy  70  22  8 
Luxembourg  64  33  3 
Netherlands  52  47  0 
Austria  - - -
Portugal  60  29  11 
Finland  - - -
Sweden  - - -
United Kingdom  70  29  1 
Source: Eurostat, Initial results from ECHP 
-missing data 
Lone parents  Couples with children 
Own  Rent  Rent-free  Own  Rent  Rent-free 
34  65  1  75  23  2 
24  76  0  79  21  0 
16  83  1  49  49  2 
59  33  8  74  21  5 
65  28  7  78  14  8 
31  66  3  59  37  4 
44  52  4  84  15  1 
55  35  10  69  22  9 
56  40  4  68  29  3 
18  82  0  71  29  0 
- - - - - -
40  51  9  51  26  13 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
37  62  1  75  24  1 
this stage. Deducting net housing and local taxes, that is the amount payable after 
the receipt of any relevant housing benefit or rebates, gives net income after housing 
costs. 
Results of the model family analysis 
The first two Figures, 4.1a and 4.lb, show how the tax and benefit system operates 
to alter the market distribution of income for two selected families. 
1.  A couple with three school age children, with one earner on half average 
earnings (or the minimum wage if  higher-Belgium, Denmark, France and 
Luxembourg have minimum wages which are greater than half average 
earnings). This is in effect a poor larger family. It can be seen from the chart 
that the families in Denmark and Luxembourg start with the highest gross 
earnings. After the impact of direct taxes this family in Luxembourg still 
has the highest income but the family in Denmark has fallen below those in 
Belgium, the UK and Ireland by virtue of the level of taxes it must pay. 
When benefits are added to the equation, although the family in Luxembourg 
still has the highest income, similar families in Sweden, the UK, Belgium 
and Finland move up the league table. Finally when net housing costs 
are taken into account the family in Luxembourg is no longer the best 
off:  due to generous housing subsidies for families at this income level 
families in Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, Germany and the UK are best 
off. Famila Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  61
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Figure 4.1b: Redistributive  effects - couple with two children, two earners, 1.5
average plus L.5 average earnings.62  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
There are three important lessons to be learned from these comparisons. First, 
the level of earnings is not (at least at this level) the final determinant of a 
family's relative after-transfer incomes. Secondly, there is a good deal of re-
ranking that goes on at different stages of the distributive process - for 
example before and after housing costs are taken into account. Thirdly, if 
Luxembourg, the southern EU countries and Austria are excluded the post 
transfer (before housing costs) incomes of the families in these countries are 
remarkably similar-in the range £700 to £900 per month. Fourthly, in most 
countries the benefit system does little more than replace the earnings taken 
in taxation, even for this family.  In Denmark, The Netherlands and the 
southern EU countries it fails even to do that. 
2.  A couple with two school age children both parents working for 1.5 average 
male and female earnings. This is a well off 'standard' family. No country 
leaves this family better off after the impact of taxes and benefits but there 
are still re-rankings between countries at different stages of the redistributive 
process. The families in Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands have the 
highest earnings. After tax and benefits families in Luxembourg and the UK 
are best off. In all countries this family pays more in tax than they receive in 
benefits - indeed the level of taxation is a more important determinant of 
final income than gross earnings. 
In order to explore how family incomes compare in EU countries the next 
three charts compare the level of post transfer income (before housing costs) 
of couples with one, two and three school age children at different earnings 
levels. Regardless of the number of children, earnings level or number of 
earners, the families in Luxembourg have the highest disposable income. 
More unexpectedly perhaps, families in the UK have the next highest 
disposable income (apart from Ireland, at  half average earnings). The relative 
position of other countries varies with the number of children, the earnings 
levels and whether there are one or two earners. Thus for example two earner 
families with three children in France and Germany have the third highest 
disposable incomes, but  families with two children and one earner on average 
earnings in France are only better off than similar families in the southern 
European countries and Austria. These variations are a function of the impact 
of the tax and benefit systems in different countries. 
Support for families with children 
An important element in a country's tax and benefit system is the support provided 
towards the costs of rearing children through the package of cash benefits, tax 
allowances or credits and remissions of charges. This section compares the value of 
these benefits to working families, expressed as the difference between the net 
disposable resources of a childless couple and a couple with children at the same 
earnings. 
Tables 4.11  and 4.12 show how that package is made up for a couple with two 
school age children, at two different earnings levels. In the lower earnings case it 
can be seen that seven countries deliver some of the child support package through 
child tax allowances or credits, with France and Germany providing the majority 
of their assistance in this manner. On low earnings these tax allowances are only of Family  lncomes and Tax-Benefit Policies 63
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Figure 4.2a: Couple and one school  age child - incomes at five earnings levels
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Figure 4.2b: Couple and two school age children - incomes at five earnings
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Figure 4.2e Couple and three school age children - incomes at five earnings
levels (after taxes and transfers,  before housing)
Table 4.11: Structure of child benefit package - one eamer,0.5 average earnings
€ Stg PPPs per month
Country
Child tax
allowance/
ffedit
Non means
tested child
benefit
Means
tested child
benefit
Health
c0sts
School
c0sts
Other TotaI
Belgium 38.22 r59.36 -4.77 -16.66 176.81
Denmark 81.54 -.59 80.95
Germany 61,.92 55.73 Ir7.65
Greece 13.50 -24.& -20.38 -3r.52
Spain 31.10 -10.& 20.46
France &.69 6jl -5.45 63.81 n9.n
Ireland 40.82 188.46 -87.90 141.38
Italy 9j9 10.20 -7.75 -9.79 2.45
Luxembourg 176.88 -2.09 174.79
Netherlands 88.75 10.03 -L5.20 83.58
Austria r5970 -29.23 -4.50 L25.97
Portugal 27.4t -11.86 -3.72 11.83
Finland 133.96 -2.70 25.34 82.24 238.U
Sweden 96.22 -5.52 28.86 80.89 200.45
United Kingdom 81.68 92.39 174.07Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  65 
Table 4.12:  Structure of  child benefit package-two earners, average+ 0.66 average 
earnings. £ Stg PPPs per month 
Child tax  Non means  Means  Health  School  Other  Total 
Country  allowance/  tested child  tested child  costs  costs 
credit  benefit  benefit 
Belgium  56.16  159.36  -4.11  -16.66  194.75 
Denmark  81.54  -.60  80.84 
Germany  65.94  43.34  103.28 
Greece  13.62  13.50  -24.64  -20.38  -19.31 
Spain  23.41  -10.64  12.77 
France  94.26  64.69  6.71  -5.35  103.11 
Ireland  40.82  -22.78  -94.69  -76.65 
Italy  12.65  -7.76  -9.79  -4.90 
Luxembourg  57.18  176.88  -2.09  231.97 
Netherlands  88.75  -15.20  73.55 
Austria  159.70  -29.23  -4.50  125.97 
Portugal  19.01  27.41  -11.86  -5.65  28.91 
Finland  133.96  -2.70  25.34  156.59 
Sweden  96.22  -12.12  28.86  106.35 
United Kingdom  81.68  81.68 
any value to the families in Belgium and Italy.  It is in the nature of child tax 
allowances that their value increases as earnings increase. All the EU countries 
except Spain and Italy have a system of universal child or family allowances paid 
regardless of income (although in Germany it is of more value at low earnings, see 
below). Spain and Italy have modest (means tested) child allowance schemes. In 
addition France, Ireland and the UK have in-work income-related schemes and in 
Germany, Finland and Sweden families with one earner on half average earnings 
are entitled to social assistance to top up income. 
Two earner families are expected to contribute to health costs in every country 
except Germany, The Netherlands and the UK, though in most countries the amount 
is modest. For the low-earner family these charges are reduced in Sweden and 
abolished in Ireland. Seven countries have some charges associated with going to 
school and these are much higher in Ireland than in the other countries. Finland 
and Sweden provide a free school meal to all school children regardless of earnings 
and France provides them for the family with low earnings. 
From this we see something of the structure of the child benefit package in each 
country. Figure 4.3a takes a couple with two school age children and shows how 
the value of the child benefit package varies with the earnings of the family. For the 
low, one earner family this package is most generous in Finland followed by  Sweden. 
In  these countries families at that income level are entitled to social assistance. Ireland 
and the UK also have means-tested schemes which supplement low earnings and 
all four countries have child benefit packages which are more generous at low 66 European  Obseraatory on National Family Policies
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Figure 4.3a: Value of child benefit package by earnings GHC) couple with two
children  aged.7 and 8 years old
Figure 4.3b: Value of child benefit'package  by nunber of children (BHC) one
earner family on average earnings
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earnings levels. In Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg the child benefit 
package is most generous for two earner couples, because of the increasing value 
of tax allowances. Denmark is the only country where earnings have no effect on 
the child benefit package. At higher earnings Italy and Ireland have negative child 
benefit packages because the benefits do not compensate for educational expenses 
which parents are expected to pay. 
Figure 4.3b shows how the child benefit package varies with the number of children 
(for a one earner family on average male earnings). Belgium, France, Luxembourg 
and Sweden are all proportionally more generous to the third child in the family. In 
the other countries the third child is treated the same or less generously. The UK, 
Ireland and Luxembourg are the only countries to treat the first child more 
generously. 
The value of the child benefit package varies both between and within countries 
according to family type, number and age of children and whether housing costs 
are taken into account. This means that the overall level of the child benefit package 
is not easy to compare. However an effort is made in the following tables, based on 
the average value of the package to fifteen different families. These families are of 
course not fully representative of families in the countries and they deliberately 
exclude lone parents and families with pre-school children. The overall amount of 
child benefit paid to these families in a given country is expressed as a percentage 
of the mean for all countries. Thus the Tables 4.13a and 4.13b give a ranking and a 
measure of dispersion. 
Table 4.13a:  Child benefit package-couples with 
children, before housing 
Rankings  % difference from the mean for 
all countries 
Luxembourg  177 
Belgium  86 
Austria  36 
France  32 
Finland  29 
Sweden  9 
Germany  2 
Ireland  -9 
United Kingdom  -17 
Netherlands  -26 
Denmark  -33 
Greece  -66 
Portugal  -67 
Italy  -74 
Spain  -79 68  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
Luxembourg is an outlier in the EU countries with a child benefit package more 
than twice as generous as any other country. Then there are broadly three groups of 
countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece have the least generous child benefit 
package; Belgium, France and Finland have the most generous; the other countries 
fall  in between these groups with some reranking depending on whether the 
comparisons are made before or after housing costs. 
Lone parents 
Table 4.13b:  Child benefit package - difference 
from the mean - couples with children, after 
housing 
Rankings  % difference from  the mean for 
all countries 
Luxembourg  331 
France  155 
Belgium  138 
Finland  109 
Germany  41 
United Kingdom  26 
Sweden  25 
Netherlands  -28 
Denmark  -30 
Austria  -62 
Portugal  -73 
Ireland  -97 
Italy  -117 
Spain  -129 
Greece  -227 
The previous analysis was restricted to couples with children. This section 
concentrates on the treatment of lone parent families by the tax benefit systems. In 
Figure 4.4 and Tables 4.14a and 4.14b the income of a lone parent is compared with 
a single person without children. It can be seen from Figure 4.4. that at average 
earnings lone parents in Luxembourg (followed by Germany and the UK) have the 
highest overall post-transfer incomes and lone parents in Greece and Portugal have 
the lowest. 
Table 4.14a looks at the differences in disposable incomes of lone parents and single 
people on the same earnings. In order to compare the role of the benefit system in 
supporting lone parents, the value of the tax/benefit package for lone parents 
includes tax allowances as well as the value of the child benefit package. The relative 
position of a lone parent varies according to the earnings level and the number of 
children. Thus with one child on half average earnings the lone parent in Germany 
is best off compared with a single person, with the lone parent in Ireland next best 
off. With two children the lone parent in Germany still does best but now Finland Family Incomes and Tax-Beneftt Policies 69
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Figure 4.4: Incomes  of lone parents and single people
Thble 4.14a: Difference betweennet disposable  incomes of lone parents and single
people (Before housing  costs) Purchasing Power Parities,  f, sterling
Country
HaIf aaerage  earnings Aaerage earnings 1.5 aaerage  earnings
1 (7) 2 (7, 8) 1 (7) 2 (7, 8) 1 (7) 2 (7, 8)
Belgium 66.r5 I79.r8 66.L5 r79.18 66.15 L79.18
Denmark 140.85 260.93 140.85 260.93 140.85 260.93
Germany 202.79 365.94 210.53 375.23 236.53 412.07
Greece 10.40 -2.43 L4,6L 5.31 L2.85 6.84
Spain L2.99 25.97 57.r7 65.52 66.49 74.83
France 7T.OT 206.81 LL2.26 27r.50 L38.42 294.36
Ireland L74.79 207.70 102.50 71,.rc 32.M -L.24
Italy 55.90 24.08 27.34 49.38 19.18 9.39
Luxembourg 65.40 174.79 2L4.84 348.67 182.73 374.53
Netherlands 98.48 138.9L L23.40 158.66 1,40.73 r57.1,4
Austria 78.08 145.08 78.L2 145.13 78.08 145.08
Portugal 9.86 15.78 L2.65 25.36 L2.71 25.33
Finland L57.42 330.43 L57.42 330.43 L57.42 330.43
Sweden 90.06 228.29 135.02 273.25 135.02 270.04
United Kingdom 736.86 222.87 93.87 130.48 93.87 130.4870  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
comes next. A lone parent with two children in Greece on half average earnings is 
worse off than a single person and the same is true for the lone parent with two 
children in Ireland on 1.5 times average earnings-again as a result of school-related 
costs. 
A second way to compare the treatment of lone parents by the tax benefit system is 
to compare the ratio of the post-transfer incomes of lone parents and couples with 
the same earnings and number of children (see Table 4.14b). In most countries lone 
parent families are treated slightly more generously than couples by the tax benefit 
system but again the picture varies with earnings and the number of children. Thus 
for example with two children on average earnings a lone parent in Sweden is 15 
per cent better off than a one earner couple on average earnings, but if the lone 
parent were on half average earnings they would have only 86 per cent of the net 
income of a couple. Belgium is the only country in which the lone parent is 
consistently worse off than a couple. 
Table 4.14b: Net disposable incomes of lone parents as proportion of net income 
of one earner couples (before housing costs) 
Country 
Half average earnings  Average earnings  1.5 average earnings 
1 (7)  2 (7, 8)  1 (7)  2 (7, 8)  1 (7)  2 (7, 8) 
Belgium  93  94  90  91  92  93 
Denmark  103  115  98  106  96  102 
Germany  105  119  103  111  97  105 
Greece  104  105  102  102  101  102 
Spain  102  102  100  101  100  100 
France  92  113  102  110  101  105 
Ireland  95  95  87  86  102  102 
Italy  101  99  98  97  100  98 
Luxembourg  88  100  99  100  90  91 
Netherlands  101  101  109  111  108  108 
Austria  103  102  102  102  101  101 
Portugal  102  102  100  100  96  96 
Finland  96  100  112  118  109  116 
Sweden  82  86  111  115  109  116 
United Kingdom  104  104  103  103  102  102 
Child care 
So far the analysis has been restricted to families with school age children. Now we 
try to take account of that element of the tax and benefit package which concerns 
child-care. The arrangements to help parents with a pre-school child vary 
considerably from country to country. We  asked the informants to provide an 
estimate of the costs of the most prevalentform of formal day care available in their 
respective countries. Table 4.15 compares the costs to parents in different 
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Again it is clear that child-care costs vary considerably between countries. In  Belgium 
and France child-care is free of charge regardless of earnings and in Germany the 
charge is very small across the board. In addition in Luxembourg and Finland child-
care is free for the lone parent with a pre-school age child and heavily subsidised in 
a number of countries. Only in Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom are there no 
direct subsidies for a lone parent on this income. Child-care continues to be 
subsidised for the lone parent on average earnings in most countries but for the 
two earner higher paid couple child care is still only directly subsidised in Germany, 
Belgium and France. Nevertheless direct and indirect subsidies and differences in 
the child-care arrangements covered in the matrix mean that the costs of child-care 
vary substantially as a proportion of average earnings; from 35 per cent in Greece 
and 33 per cent in Italy to nothing in Belgium and France and three per cent in 
Germany. 
Table 4.15: Costs of child-care. £sterling, purchasing power parities per month 
Net childcare  Net childcare  Net childcare costs  Gross childcare 
costs lone  costs lone  two earner couple 1.5  costs as a 
Country  parent on half  parent on  average male plus 1.5  proportion of 
average  average  average female  average 
earnings  earnings  earnings  earnings 
Belgium  - - - -
Denmark  44  113  113  7 
Germany  19  43  51  3 
Greece  245  245  245  35 
Spain  163  163  163  17 
France  - - - -
Ireland  44  265  265  20 
Italy  42  90  337  33 
Luxembourg  - 105  314  23 
Netherlands  71  191  318  21 
Austria  64  127  127  10 
Portugal  26  82  123  19 
Finland  - 114  148  13 
Sweden  38  76  163  15 
United Kingdom  347  347  347  24 
Another way to compare the impact of child-care costs is shown in Table 4.16. This 
shows the value of the child benefit package after the impact of child-care costs. 
For a lone parent on average earnings the value of the child benefit package is more 
than completely absorbed by the costs of child-care in all the countries except 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. For a 
two earner couple the value of the child benefit package is completely absorbed in 
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Table 4.16: 1995 Impact of child  care costs on the child benefit package: Difference 
in net income before housing, lone parent/single person, couple/childless couple. 
Lone parents and couples with one pre-school age child.  £Stg PPPs per month 
Country  Lone parent  Lone parent  Couple average  Couple 
0.5 average  average  + 0.66  1.5 + 1.5 
Belgium  59  59  59  59 
Denmark  115  46  -54  -54 
Germany  167  148  4  11 
Greece  -224  -220  -246  -213 
Spain  -153  -106  -147  -155 
France  154  190  123  55 
Ireland  169  -115  -313  -261 
Italy  20  -57  -109  -333 
Luxembourg  52  96  -81  -150 
Netherlands  23  -71  -289  -301 
Austria  17  -47  -66  -81 
Portugal  -14  -66  -73  -107 
Finland  145  31  -56  -91 
Sweden  38  45  -76  -131 
United Kingdom  -88  -253  -302  -302 
Social assistance 
Social assistance in many countries represents the floor or minimum income that 
families are expected to receive. It  is thus indicative of each country's evaluation of 
its poverty level. Variations in social assistance paid to families of different kinds 
also represent an implied equivalence scale; an evaluation of differences in their 
needs. The ratio of income on social assistance to net income in work represents a 
replacement ratio and thus some index of the incentive structure facing families. 
However, social assistance is not easy to compare. Eardley et al  (1996 a and b) 
rehearsed the problems in a two volume comparison of social assistance schemes 
in OECD countries. In many countries social assistance rates of  benefit are not fixed 
nationally but determined locally sometimes with a considerable degree of officer 
level discretion. The figures given in the tables are based on estimates of the 
allowances paid in a given place. Location is most likely to make a difference in 
Sweden, Italy and Spain. Greece and Portugal have no general social assistance 
scheme. Figures given relate to unemployment assistance and means-tested child 
benefits. In comparing the levels of social assistance it is particularly important to 
have regard to the situation before and after housing costs. This is because in some 
countries some help with rent is included in the basic social assistance scales. 
It can be seen in Tables 4.17a and 4.17b that the level of social assistance varies with 
the type of family and the number and ages of the children. For a couple with two 
school age children it is highest in Luxembourg and Denmark and lowest in Italy 
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Table 4.17a:  Social assistance incomes (PPPs) £sterling (before housing costs) 
Single  Couple  Lone  Lone  Lone  Couple  Couple  Couple  Couple 
Country  parent  parent  parent  +1  +1  +2  +3 
+1  +1  +2  child  child  children  children 
child (2)  child (7)  children  (2)  (7) 
Belgium  345  459  527  534  637  525  532  635  771 
Denmark  373  707  607  585  737  948  929  970  1031 
Germany  346  519  543  543  674  625  625  735  841 
Greece  29  29  66  55  33  17  6  -16  -39 
Spain  194  222  237  240  280  259  262  302  336 
France  196  280  431  316  405  365  369  471  573 
Ireland  276  453  374  331  374  531  487  522  557 
Italy  29  49  61  56  113  61  56  113  169 
Luxembourg  512  779  660  649  879  927  916  1146  1414 
Netherlands  393  555  538  542  582  584  591  628  674 
Austria  205  294  398  398  513  515  515  633  765 
Portugal  187  237  250  249  254  244  243  249  287 
Finland  291  491  406  419  603  600  612  765  902 
Sweden  387  521  429  463  597  562  596  731  906 
United Kingdom  202  316  338  355  441  430  447  534  655 
Table 4.17b:  Social assistance net disposable incomes (PPPs) £ sterling (after 
housing costs) 
Single  Couple  Lone  Lone  Lone  Couple  Couple  Couple  Couple 
Country  parent  parent  parent  +1  +1  +2  +3 
+1  +1  +2  child  child  children  children 
child (2)  child (7)  children  (2)  (7) 
Belgium  167  247  315  322  398  312  320  396  533 
Denmark  256  530  499  477  627  757  738  767  858 
Germany  346  519  543  543  674  625  625  735  841 
Greece  -120  -120  -157  -167  -189  -206  -216  -238  -335 
Spain  -37  -53  -38  -35  -33  -54  -51  -11  24 
France  98  142  325  211  293  221  224  358  491 
Ireland  251  419  342  298  334  492  527  476  504 
Italy  24  42  54  49  102  54  49  102  158 
Luxembourg  317  533  413  403  581  681  670  848  1116 
Netherlands  290  450  441  445  477  482  489  529  578 
Austria  162  154  221  221  297  300  300  359  433 
Portugal  120  169  183  181  187  177  175  181  219 
Finland  203  343  340  353  526  480  492  642  793 
Sweden  387  521  429  463  597  562  596  731  906 
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of countries when housing costs are taken into account. The negative figures in 
Table 4.18b illustrate once again the problems with housing costs. The families on 
social assistance in those countries would be unable to meet the assumed housing 
costs and would be likely to have to move to cheaper housing, rely on relatives or 
earn in the informal economy. These are in fact the countries which have the highest 
proportions of families living in rent-free accommodation (see Table 4.10). 
Tables 4.18a and 4.18b compare the replacement rate represented by the social 
assistance scales. The replacement rate is the proportion of net income and average 
earnings which is replaced by social assistance. A high replacement rate implies 
that there is less incentive to enter employment. Replacement rates are high across 
Table 4.18a: Net disposable income on social assistance as % net disposable 
income at 0.5 average earnings, before housing 
Single  Couple  Lone  Lone  Lone  Couple  Couple  Couple  Couple 
Country  parent  parent  parent  +1  +1  +2  +3 
+1  +1  +2  child  child  children  children 
child (2)  child (7)  children  (2)  (7) 
Belgium  65  80  90  90  90  83  83  84  87 
Denmark  74  122  99  91  97  148  149  146  147 
Germany  68  85  81  77  77  93  93  101  102 
Greece  10  10  120  19  12  6  2  -6  -15 
Spain  44  51  83  53  60  58  59  67  73 
France  39  56  66  56  57  70  60  75  68 
Ireland  53  72  54  47  51  68  66  68  70 
Italy  7  11  14  12  25  13  12  25  39 
Luxembourg  69  106  84  81  96  118  101  126  131 
Netherlands  72  93  94  84  85  92  92  92  93 
Austria  44  63  83  74  85  98  98  107  113 
Portugal  69  88  98  89  89  89  89  89  99 
Finland  70  97  72  73  81  80  102  103  102 
Sweden  98  98  99  95  96  100  100  100  100 
United Kingdom  35  53  69  49  55  62  65  69  73 
the board in Denmark and Luxembourg. For the couple with three children, 
replacement rates after housing costs are over 100 per cent in seven countries, and 
over 90 per cent in a further three, suggesting that such families have very few 
incentives to take up low paid offers of work. Lone parents with a pre-school child 
also have replacement rates close to or in excess of 100 per cent in five countries. 
Table 4.19 presents a picture of the implied equivalence scale in social assistance 
with the amounts paid to childless couples set at 100. There is very considerable 
variation in the ways countries evaluate the relative needs of different type of 
families. Denmark and Italy are comparatively ungenerous to single childless 
persons. Austria and France are comparatively generous to lone parent families 
and Italy is most generous to couples with three children. Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  75 
The contribution of a working spouse 
Finally, we compare the contribution made to family income by the earnings of a 
working spouse. This will depend on the relative level of female earnings. However, 
it  will also depend on how those earnings are treated by the income tax and social 
security system and how any cash benefits are altered. In Table 4.20 we present the 
percentage extra net income that results from a spouse earning 0.66 average female 
earnings and 1.5 average female earnings. In the first case a working spouse in a 
childless couple adds an extra 85 per cent in Luxembourg compared with only an 
extra 35 per cent in Germany. The next two columns compare the extra net income 
for a couple with children assuming that child-care would be required in the second 
column and that no child-care would be required in the third column. It  can be seen 
that when child-care is involved a working spouse on this income would only add 
six per cent to the net income in Finland and The Netherlands and only nine per 
cent in the UK. The strongest incentive for the spouse to earn after taking account 
of child-care is in Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg. If  no child-care is involved 
then the extra contribution of a working spouse varies from 22 per cent in Ireland 
to 60 per cent in Luxembourg. 
Although the patterns are similar when one compares the contribution made by a 
working spouse at the higher earnings level, the rankings of the countries alter. For 
higher-income couples with child-care costs, Sweden and France offer the best 
incentives, while Luxembourg joins the UK and Finland at the bottom end of the 
incentive structure. For couples at this income level who do not have child-care 
costs the highest percentage gains are in Greece and Sweden; the lowest in Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK.  Percentage gains in Portugal and Italy are also much 
higher than for the lower-earning couple. 
Table 4.18b:  Net disposable income on social assistance as % net disposable 
income at 0.5 average earnings, after housing 
Single  Couple  Lone  Lone  Lone  Couple  Couple  Couple  Couple 
Country  parent  parent  parent  +1  +1  +2  +3 
+1  +1  +2  child  child  children  children 
child (2)  child (7)  children  (2)  (7) 
Belgium  49  69  85  85  86  74  75  77  82 
Denmark  69  126  101  92  98  146  148  143  144 
Germany  97  124  112  104  95  125  125  121  118 
Greece  -92  -82  93  -251  -352  -319  -398  -575  758 
Spain  -18  -34  -358  -20  -22  -41  -39  -8  16 
France  34  55  69  55  55  74  57  80  69 
Ireland  55  73  54  47  50  67  77  66  67 
Italy  6  10  13  11  25  12  11  24  39 
Luxembourg  69  130  89  85  109  147  115  159  158 
Netherlands  77  100  102  87  88  98  99  98  98 
Austria  53  73  99  78  95  128  129  150  163 
Portugal  59  84  97  85  85  85  85  85  98 
Finland  84  100  75  75  82  86  70  100  100 
Sweden  203  161  149  136  128  136  133  135  127 
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Table 4.19:  Social assistance implied equivalence scale (couple rate= 100), before 
housing costs 
Single  Couple  Lone  Lone  Lone  Couple  Couple  Couple  Couple 
Country  parent  parent  parent  +1  +1  +2  +3 
+1  +1  +2  child  child  children  children 
child (2)  child (7)  children  (2)  (7) 
Belgium  75  100  115  116  139  114  116  138  168 
Denmark  53  100  86  83  104  134  131  137  146 
Germany  67  100  105  105  130  120  120  142  162 
Greece  100  100  227  192  114  57  22  -56  -134 
Spain  88  100  107  108  126  117  118  136  152 
France  70  100  154  113  145  131  132  168  205 
Ireland  61  100  83  73  83  117  108  115  123 
Italy  58  100  125  115  230  125  115  230  345 
Luxembourg  66  100  85  83  113  119  118  147  181 
Netherlands  71  100  97  98  105  105  106  113  122 
Austria  70  100  135  135  174  175  175  215  260 
Portugal  79  100  106  105  108  103  102  105  121 
Finland  59  100  83  85  123  122  125  156  184 
Sweden  74  100  82  86  109  108  112  135  166 
United Kingdom  64  100  107  112  140  136  141  169  207 
Table 4.20:  Percentage increase in household income contributed by  second earner 
0.66 average female earnings  1.5 average female earnings 
Country  childless  one child  one child  childless  one child  one child 
couple  (2 yrs)  (7 yrs)  couple  (2 yrs)  (7 yrs) 
Belgium  47  56  44  62  59  58 
Denmark  41  46  40  64  52  62 
Germany  35  31  33  56  51  54 
Greece  57  12  58  71  41  84 
Spain  37  17  36  55  40  54 
France  44  38  40  63  63  63 
Ireland  42  15  22  62  43  64 
Italy  53  35  49  78  47  78 
Luxembourg  85  44  60  58  37  54 
Netherlands  42  6  44  67  42  68 
Austria  52  34  49  69  53  64 
Portugal  54  34  53  73  56  72 
Finland  61  6  56  70  29  65 
Sweden  56  36  52  87  64  82 
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Conclusion 
It is clear from this chapter that there is very considerable diversity within the 
European Union- diversity in the prevalence of poverty among families with 
children and diversity in both the structure and level of support that countries 
provide to help mitigate some of the costs borne by parents in raising children. It  is 
not the case that all countries are experiencing increases in poverty and inequality 
as a result of international economic pressures and demographic change. Countries 
are making choices through their social and fiscal policy and some are doing more 
than others to protect  families from these forces. So it is not the case that all countries 
are having to cut back on the tax and benefit policies designed to help families with 
children. 
It  is difficult to discern any single rationale for the degree of difference observed in 
this analysis.  Within countries there is considerable variation of treatment of 
families according to the type of family, the number and ages of children, whether 
in a family there is no earner, one earner or two earners, the level of earnings and 
according to the housing costs of the family. These within country differences make 
between country comparisons extremely  difficult.  Nevertheless  there  are big 
differences in the overall treatment of families and they cannot  be explained simply 
be the level of GDP or the level of spending on social protection. The character of 
welfare state systems is derived over a long period of time and has its roots in 
culture, political structure and economic development. Nevertheless, family policy 
has been changing quite rapidly in recent years in some countries and in the 1996 
report of the Observatory it is intended to focus our analysis on how the tax and 
benefit system in EU countries has changed over time using the data on model 
families that has been collected in the last three years. 
Notes 
(a)  Earnings cases: 1. Couples and lone parents with one earner receiving half 
national average male earnings; 2. Couples and lone parents with one earner 
receiving national average male earnings; 3. Couples and lone parents with 
one earner receiving one and a  half national average male earnings; 4. 
Couples with one earner receiving national average male earnings and the 
other receiving 0.66 average female earnings; 5.  Couples with one earner 
receiving one and a  half national average male earnings and the other 
receiving one and a  half national average female earnings; 6.  The social 
assistance case. 
(b) Package  of health  care:  Three visits per person (including each child) to a 
general practitioner per year, three standard courses of antibiotics per person 
per year (including each child) per year, one visit to the dentist for a check up 
and a filling per person per year (including each child). 
(c)  For childcare costs a standard package is established for each country based 
on the costs of the most prevalent form of pre-school provision in each 
country. For example, in Denmark subsidised public nursery schools are the 
most common form of childcare and so the subsidies costs of childcare is 
deducted. On the other hand, in the UK private childminders are used most 
frequently, and the fees charged by childminders are deducted. 
-------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------78  European Observatory on National Family Policies 
For school costs all children are assumed to be attending state school and are 
living close enough for the children to walk to school thus incurring no 
transport costs. Small, voluntary contributions to school funds or for outings 
are ignored. Only costs which parents must pay for books, stationery or 
equipment or any benefits that families may receive in the form of free or 
subsidised school meals or in terms of reduced costs for books, stationery or 
equipment or grant towards school clothing are included. 
(d) Housing  assumptions:  It is  assumed  that  all  cases  are  living  in  rented 
dwellings, of a kind which is the most common form of renting in a selected 
city or town in each country, whether this is provided by a local authority, a 
housing co-operative  or a  private  landlord. It was suggested  that the 
following assumptions were made about the size of the dwelling: single 
people renting a  one bedroom dwelling, couples without children and 
couples and lone parents with one child renting a two bedroom dwelling and 
couples and lone parents with two or three children are renting a  three 
bedroom dwelling. 
(e)  Locations: 
Belgium  - Antwerp 
Denmark - Copenhagen 
Germany - Mannheim 
Greece  - Athens 
Spain  - Madrid 
France  - Fontanay-aux-Roses 
Ireland  - Dublin 
Italy  - Rome 
Luxembourg  - Luxembourg City 
Netherlands  - Nijmegen 
Austria  - Vienna 
Portugal  - Lisbon 
Finland  - Helsinki 
Sweden  - Goteborg 
United Kingdom- York APPENDIX 
Benefit and Tax Changes in 1995/6 
The following summaries describe the main details of the 1995/96 changes to 
national tax and benefit system provided by the members of the Observatory. The 
impact of these changes is not fully reflected in the model families analysis, which 
is fixed at May 1995. 
Belgium 
From 1 September 1995 young people are entitled to child benefit if  they follow part-
time vocational education or secondary education with limited curriculum. 
Denmark 
From January 1996 all children up to the age of 16 years are offered nine preventive 
medical examinations by general practitioners free of charge. The new Act also 
includes measures on enhanced support for children and adolescents at risk. Rates 
of compensation for parental leave were reduced from 1 January 1995, from 80 per 
cent to 70 per  cent of the base amount and will be further reduced to 60 per cent from 
1 April1997. 
Germany 
In the 1996 Annual Taxation Law new regulations were laid down for, among other 
things, the equalisation of the family burden, the exemption of the subsistence 
minimum from taxation and the promotion of property ownership for the family. 
The child benefit for the first and second child will be increased as from 1.1.1996 to 
DM200 each for the first and second child, to DM300 for the third child and to 
DM350 a month for each subsequent child. As from 1 January 1997 the child benefit 
for the first and second child will be increased again to DM220 a month. The child 
benefit supplement for low incomes has been abandoned, also the reduction of 
child benefit for  higher incomes.  In most cases child benefit will in future be 
calculated by the employer with income tax and-in the case of a positive residual 
amount - paid out directly with wages. The child benefit fund takes over the 
payment of child benefit only for claimants who have no employment or whose 
employers are exempt from  the obligation to  pay. The annual children's tax 
allowance will be raised as from 1 January 1996 to DM6,264 and from 1 January 1997 
to DM6,912. In comparison with child benefit, the amount of tax saved is higher, the 
higher the income. The general age threshold was raised from 16 to 18 years of age. 
Up to the eighteenth year child benefit is paid in each case, regardless of whether 
the child is in education or has his/her own income. 
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In 1996  the annual income of single persons below DM12,095, and of married 
persons below DM24,190, remains tax free. In 1997 and 1998 the thresholds will be 
DM12,365 for single persons and DM24,730 for married persons. The existence 
minimum for children will be assured by the revision of the equalisation of the 
family benefit. 
Greece 
The most notable changes are the doubling of the tax exemption in respect of home 
purchase (which is related to both housing policy and to the cost of housing,) which 
has risen by between 20 per cent and 30 per cent in the five years to 1995 and the 
increase in tax exemption where a property is transferred to children or inherited by 
them (Law 2362/95). A small increase to the (generally low) monthly allowances 
was announced in July 1995. It  is to be noted that all family allowances have failed 
to keep pace with prices during 1995, as in the past few years. 
Spain 
The State Budget Law for 1995 introduced some important innovations concerning 
families. Deductions for family dependants were adjusted upwards in proportion 
to  inflation  forecasts  for  1995  (3.5  per cent).  The  increase  will  maintain  the 
deductions at their 1994level, although nothing has been done to compensate for 
the reduction in real terms caused by the failure to index since the fiscal reform of 
1991. Tax thresholds have also been correspondingly increased. 
The maximum rental costs deduction remained unchanged at Pta 75,000. However, 
as in 1994,  the 1995  increase in the taxable income threshold for  this type of 
deduction considerably exceeded the rate of inflation, as it was raised from Pta 3 
million to Pta 3.5 million for individual tax declarations and from Pta 4.5 million to 
Pta 5 million for joint declarations, increasing the number of eligible beneficiaries. 
The major change, as far as the family is concerned, is the introduction for the first 
time of differential levels of deductions for children on the basis of their birth order. 
The deduction for the first and second child is unchanged (Pta 20,700, adjusted for 
inflation). For the third, the deduction is raised to Pta 25,000 (Pta 30,000 for fourth 
and subsequent children). Value added tax was raised from 15 to 16 per cent on 1 
January 1995 and this disproportionately affects large families, whose consumption 
represents a larger part of their income. 
France 
By August 1995, the government had already decided to increase the VAT rate 
(from 18.6 per cent to 20.6  per cent). Under the Juppe Plan, all family benefits 
managed  by  the  state  as  employer,  and  certain  public  companies,  will  be 
transferred to the CNAF over the next two years, and contributions, which are 
currently paid at a reduced rate, will be brought into line with those paid by other 
companies, making savings of FF0.7 billion in 1996. 
Ireland 
Child Benefit payments were substantially increased (ie. by  £7 per month per child), 
while simultaneously putting a freeze on Child Dependant Allowance. One of the 
principal benefits  of  this  policy  change  is  that it  reduces  child  poverty and 
addresses the unemployment and poverty traps created by the existing Child Benefit and Tax Changes in 1995/6  81 
Dependant Allowances. Child Benefit was also extended to include all children up 
to 18 years old, except those between the ages of 16 to 18 who are in employment. 
Child Benefit Supplement is to replace existing Child Dependant Allowances and 
Family Income Supplement. It is intended that this Supplement will be paid to 
Social Welfare recipients and to families on low to middle incomes (Budget, 1995). 
There were no changes in the income tax rates, with the lower rate remaining at 27 
per cent and the higher rate at 48 per cent. There were, however, changes in the 
amount of income taxable at these rates. The income level charged at the lower rate 
increased from £16,400 to £17,800 for a married couple, and from £8,200 to £8,900 for 
a single person. Personal tax allowances were increased by £150 for a single person 
and £300 for a married couple, with related increases for widowed, single parent 
and widowed parent allowances. However, with the reductions in the amount of 
income tax relief for mortgage interest repayments and health insurance, benefits 
gained from the improved taxation are for the most part lost. 
Italy 
From 1996, benefits for each family nucleus with children under 18 years of age will 
increase in inverse proportion to the income of the family and, vice versa, in direct 
proportion to the number of family members, with increases specifically aimed at 
lower income families and those with four or more members. From the same date, 
benefits for single-parent families will increase by 25 per cent. 
Luxembourg 
From 1 January 1995, the basic social minimum wage and the minimum social wage 
for people with dependants no longer exist. Only two categories now remain: the 
SSM for unskilled workers and the SSM for skilled workers. An increase of more 
than three per cent was applied at the same time. 
The tax allowance for dependent children was raised from LF237,000 in 1994 to 
LF243,600  in 1995  and 1996.  The threshold above which the tax reduction for 
dependent children ceases to be progressive has also been raised. It was LF754,080 
for lone parent families and LF1,239,000 for couples in 1994. For 1995 and 1996, it 
was set at LF764,790 for lone parent families and LF1,213,800 for couples. The tax 
reduction is LF60,000 for income above these amounts but below LF1,855,000. It  is 
then applied on a sliding scale reaching zero at income equal to or above LF2.4 
million. With regard to welfare, there has been an increase of 3.5 per cent in the 
amount of the RMG (guaranteed minimum income) from 1st January 1995, on top 
of the increase due to indexing. 
Austria 
The Austrian Family Allowance Fund (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds)  is  mainly 
financed through employers' contributions (4.5 per cent) and payments out of the 
revenues of the income tax. One of the major grants paid out by the fund are the 
family allowances. In 1995 these allowances have been reduced by AS100,- per 
month per child. After this reduction they are now AS1.300,-for every child under 
10, AS1.550,- between age 10 and 19, and AS1.850,- for children older than 19 
(eligible only if attending a school or university, in which case the allowance is paid 
until the age of 27). Higher allowances (without age limit) are paid for severely 
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Austrian tax law has several tax allowances for special kinds of expenditures, for 
example  private  health  or  retirement  insurances,  for  housing  loans,  etc. 
(Sonderausgaben). The size of these allowances varies with the number of children 
and the number of breadwinners in a family, which has an important effect on the 
tax load of families. Severe reductions in these allowances are planned for 1996, 
especially for higher income brackets which will probably have stronger effects on 
families with one breadwinner than on those with two incomes. 
Portugal 
Changes in conditions of entitlement were announced at the end of 1995 by the new 
Ministry of Solidarity and Social Security, the initial idea being that selectivity 
should be introduced, with the most 'needy' families receiving higher benefits. In 
December,  it  was  announced  that  this  targeting  of  benefits  would  not  be 
implemented during 1996.  Changes expected in 1996:  introduction of income 
support, more selectivity in entitlement to benefits, other measures to support low-
income families and vulnerable families. 
Finland 
Almost all benefits were reduced again in 1995. The greatest pressure has been on 
the benefits for the unemployed. Family benefits have also been targeted. For the 
first  time, child allowances were lowered in 1995.  Since the child allowances 
increased with number of children, the reduction was six per cent for the first child, 
and rose to 16 per cent for the fifth child. In compensation for earlier cuts, paternity 
allowance was lengthened by six days so that this leave does not shorten the 
parental leave period, as earlier. 
Sweden 
For children under 16 residing in Sweden, child allowance was payable at the rate 
of SEK750 a month until31 December 1995. This is a universal, non-means-tested 
benefit. For children over 16 still attending compulsory school, extended child 
allowance is payable in the same amount as the general child allowance. It was 
decided in 1995  that child allowance should be reduced by 1/6 in the general 
amount for all children from 1 January 1996. There has been a reduction in the 
special benefit for large families- with three or more children-which is linked to 
child allowance, 1995 and 1996. It was decided in 1995 that this special benefit will 
be abolished completely for children born after 1 January 1996. 
UK 
From April 1996 Unemployment Benefit will only be available for  six months 
instead  of a  year,  and  from  October  1996  the Jobseekers  Allowance  will  be 
introduced, replacing Unemployment Benefit and Income Support. Concerns have 
been expressed as to how lone parents will be affected, in particular with regard to 
the loss of 'passported' benefits (other benefits they may be entitled to because of 
their entitlement to Income Support, such as free school meals) and the difficulties 
involved in job seeking when only limited child care is available. The government 
has announced that it will not be increasing the rates of One Parent Benefit and the 
lone parent premiums in the income related benefits in April1996. At the same time 
the government is introducing a number of other measures designed to help lone 
parents into work. Conclusions 
From year to year the changes which may be observed in either family form or 
family  policies  in European countries are  likely  to  be modest:  cumulatively, 
however, they shape perception, policy and service provision. In this report we 
have chosen to concentrate on demographic trends, the impact of tax and benefit 
policies on family well-being and to review two special topics: cohabitation and 
social protection. Although we draw on data provided from a national perspective, 
the purpose of this volume is to identify cross-national trends and developments: 
the extent of similarity or difference, convergence or divergence. Even allowing for 
limitations in data provision (there are inevitable gaps and inconsistencies) it is 
clear that despite common membership of the European Union there remains 
considerable diversity and disparity in both family formation and structure, policy 
and practice. 
For example, although every country in the EU now has a fertility rate which is 
below replacement level, uniformity must not be exaggerated: there are high rates 
of births outside of marriage in Denmark, the UK and France but Germany has a 
high proportion of childless women and in France, where there are fewer childless 
women, many more women are having just one child. Whereas low fertility rates 
can  bring  unexpected  benefits  - social,  economic  and  ecological,  including 
substantial savings on child related expenditures-there are adverse implications 
for the costs of supporting the elderly. These tensions and policy dilemmas are 
observed in all countries. 
The  available  evidence  begins  to  challenge  whether pro-natalist  policies,  as 
presently formulated, are having the effects which are intended. Such policies may 
encourage women to have babies at a slightly earlier age, but there is little evidence 
to suggest that pro-natalist policies encourage women to have more babies. Either 
pro-natalist policies are not working or they are not sufficiently generous to provide 
either  effective  compensation  or  incentives.  In  the  context  of  Europe-wide 
expenditure constraint it is most unlikely that the aggregate value of universal 
policies and benefits will be increased. 
That all countries have fertility rates below replacement level may imply some 
limited convergence but there is much less evidence of similarity when it comes to 
family  structure. There is considerable variation in the size and composition of 
households, with Ireland having the highest proportion of large families  and 
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Denmark the highest proportion of small families. Young people are spending 
longer in the parental home, especially in the Mediterranean countries and the UK. 
To draw a line between northern and southern countries is too simplistic, failing to 
acknowledge differences within each bloc.  Indeed, within individual countries 
there can be significant regional variation: in some instances differences can be 
greater within rather than between countries. 
Variation in the prevalence of cohabitation across countries is matched by disparity 
in status and legal standing of cohabitees. In some instances cohabitation is deemed 
to be more like marriage (for example, by extending entitlement to survivor's 
benefits) whereas in other countries, marriage is being made to look more like 
cohabitation (as in the contractual allocation of owner-occupied property). The 
clearest examples of convergence are to be found in the fields of tax and benefit 
policies and the extension of parental responsibility. There is least convergence of 
practices  when  dealing  with  the  allocation  of  property  following  death  or 
relationship breakdown. 
Pressure continues to be applied to social protection budgets: the prospects for 
EMU, and more particularly the alleged impact of specific convergence criteria set 
out in the Maastricht Treaty, are providing a context within which macro-economic 
policies and linked debates are being considered. Policy makers find they have 
limited flexibility, with little prospect of taxes being either substantially increased 
or decreased; the fiscal impact of demographic and social change is, on balance, 
more likely to be adverse rather than favourable. However, families (especially 
those with dependent children) have been relatively insulated from the worst 
effects of EMU linked financial re-structuring: certainly this appears to be the case 
in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and France but significantly less so in Austria 
and The Netherlands. It would also appear that social assistance budgets and 
benefits  are  more vulnerable to  cut-back than either insurance or categorical 
benefits. 
As Europe moves toward the new millennium there are grounds for continuing 
concern at the impact of high levels of unemployment on families, at the extent of 
family poverty and the limited progress being made to reconcile professional and 
family interests and obligations. Mechanisms need to be found, and consolidated, 
which will ensure the more effective inclusion of family interests and perspectives 
within the European policy making process. Bibliography 
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